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MUSCULAR PROCEDURE: CONDITIONAL DEFERENCE 
IN THE EXECUTIVE DETENTION CASES 
Joseph Landau* 
Abstract: The executive detention cases of the past several years demonstrate a rare but 
critical assertion of procedural law where the political branches fail to legislate or to properly 
implement substantive law. This is “muscular procedure”—the invocation of a procedural 
device to condition deference on political branch integrity. Courts have affected the law of 
national security in profound ways by requiring the political branches to adhere to a 
judicially imposed standard of transparency and deliberation. Courts have resolved the merits 
of individual enemy combatant challenges by rejecting executive branch decisions based on 
absolute secrecy, innuendo, tentativeness, or multiple levels of hearsay, while affirming 
executive determinations that satisfy minimal standards of reliability. More broadly, courts 
have used procedural rules to smoke out and put in check Congress’s lack of oversight of the 
executive branch and the President’s inadequate interpretation and implementation of 
authorizing legislation. Although the prevailing descriptive and normative frameworks 
advocate either blind deference to the collective expertise of the political branches or judicial 
resolution of large, complex and highly fractious substantive questions, courts have instead 
put procedure to muscular uses—focusing on the means of coordinate branch decision-
making, while still allowing the political branches to define the content of the substantive 
law. This theory of judicial review, which is grounded in the judiciary’s comparatively 
greater expertise in procedure, has implications beyond the national security context.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The executive detention cases of the past several years have prompted 
renewed debate over the proper scope of judicial deference to the 
executive branch’s claimed need to limit individual liberties during 
times of crisis. Some theorists argue that courts should resolve large 
policy questions raised by individual challenges to assertions of 
executive power.1 Others believe that courts should decide as little as 
                                                     
1. See Owen Fiss, The War Against Terrorism and the Rule of Law, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
235, 235 (2006) (“fault[ing]” the Supreme Court “for doing less than it should have” in resolving 
constitutional questions of individual liberty); Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the 
“War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1029, 1092 (2008) (noting that “the Supreme Court 
has left the final, substantive outcome of the cases at bar uncertain” and that the decisions have 
“resulted in a great deal of process, and not much justice”); see also Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting 
Guantánamo: Rights at the Brink of Dehumanization, 103 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 2009) 
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possible, asking only whether executive action is grounded within 
statutory authority.2 However, a number of the post-9/11 national 
security decisions have accomplished a great deal without following 
either approach. In these cases, the Supreme Court and a number of 
lower courts have put procedural devices to surprisingly “muscular” 
uses. The decisions illustrate a rare but critical assertion of procedural 
law where the political branches fail to legislate or properly implement 
substantive law. This is “muscular procedure”—the invocation of a 
procedural rule to condition deference on coordinate branch integrity. 
The cases provide a framework for understanding the role of judicial 
review in the post-9/11 executive detention decisions, with implications 
for other fields of law as well.3 
Many commentators have criticized the Supreme Court’s executive 
detention decisions as “merely” procedural rulings, pointing out that the 
Court has generally addressed itself to questions about adjective law or 
the ground rules of litigation: whether the Court has jurisdiction; 
whether detainees can access the courts; and whether the government is 
required to provide discovery, and if so, how much.4 Far fewer decisions 
have resolved substantive questions such as the scope of executive 
                                                     
(manuscript at 3, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1268422) 
(“Indeed, the pronouncement [in Boumediene v. Bush] that a provision of the Constitution extended 
to noncitizen wartime prisoners held outside of the sovereign United States was breathtaking, 
particularly in the face of six years of government insistence that the prisoners at Guantánamo had 
no rights whatsoever, and could be held indefinitely, even for life, without charge or meaningful 
opportunity to contest their treatment or detention. It was a rebuke to the Executive’s claims of 
outsize authority, and, the Court told us, a re-assertion of the supremacy of law. It was a rights 
moment. Or so it seemed.”); David Cole, Rights Over Borders: Transnational Constitutionalism 
and Guantanamo Bay, 2007–2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 47; cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. __, 
128 S. Ct. 2229, 2293 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“So who has won? Not the detainees. The 
Court’s analysis leaves them with only the prospect of further litigation to determine the content of 
their new habeas right, followed by further litigation to resolve their particular cases, followed by 
further litigation before the D.C. Circuit . . . .”). 
2. See RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL 
EMERGENCY 34 (2006) (arguing that during times of crisis, courts should “decid[e] cases narrowly, 
preferably on statutory grounds, hesitating to trundle out the heavy artillery of constitutional 
invalidation”); Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 50 (advancing “a 
minimalist [judicial] approach to intrusions on freedom amidst war”); see also Samuel Issacharoff 
& Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional 
Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1 (2004) (making the 
case that courts historically uphold executive decisions when grounded in congressional 
authorization). 
3. See infra Part IV.B.  
4. See infra note 29 and accompanying text; infra Part I.A. 
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power and the content of individual liberty—that is, whom the Executive 
can hold and for how long, and the specific constitutional protections 
that apply. But regardless of whether a particular decision turns on 
“process” or “substance”—an age-old distinction that resists clear 
definition5—courts have affected the law of national security in 
profound ways by explicitly requiring the political branches to adhere to 
a judicially imposed standard of transparency and deliberation. In 
individual cases, rulings about seemingly mundane procedural issues 
such as discovery and evidentiary standards have accelerated the release 
of enemy combatant detainees who were held at Guantánamo Bay years 
after being cleared of any wrongdoing.6 More broadly, procedural 
devices have been used to smoke out and put in check Congress’s lack 
of oversight of the executive branch and its misguided interpretations 
and implementation of authorizing legislation.7 
In a number of these cases, courts have resolved the merits of an 
enemy combatant8 challenge by scrutinizing the Executive’s adherence 
                                                     
5. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 192–224 (2004) 
(summarizing debates over relationship between substance and procedure); see also JERRY L. 
MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 5 (1985) (“Although much ink has been 
spilled by courts and commentators in the attempt to separate questions of substance and process, 
the attempt can never be wholly successful because the questions are functionally inseparable.”); 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 85 (“[S]ubstance and 
process are two aspects of the same phenomenon.”); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of 
Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 
1625, 1630 (1992) (“The distinction [between process and substance] has proved to be elusive (and 
perhaps illusory) in the numerous areas of law in which it has acquired rhetorical significance. In 
spite of its elusiveness, and no doubt partly because of it, the boundary between substance and 
procedure remains a Holy Grail of legal analysis.”); Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: 
Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 
848 (2003) (“At the margin, at least, the distinction between substance and procedure blurs.”). 
6. See infra Parts II.A.1–A.2. The Guantánamo Bay Naval Base was used as a facility to house 
alien detainees. Yasir Hamdi, a U.S. citizen, was originally held at Guantánamo but eventually 
transferred to a naval brig in Charleston, South Carolina, and later to Norfolk, Virginia, after it was 
determined he was a U.S. citizen. See JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTÁNAMO AND THE ABUSE OF 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 25 (2006). 
7. See infra Part II.B.  
8. The term “enemy combatant,” first used by the Bush Administration to describe certain terror 
suspects held at Guantánamo Bay and elsewhere after 9/11, was jettisoned by the Obama 
Administration in March 2009. See William Glaberson, U.S. Won’t Label Terror Suspects as 
Combatants, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2009, at A1. But the Obama Administration claims authority to 
detain virtually the same range of individuals as those included in the Bush Administration 
definition. See Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority 
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 2, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-
0442 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009) (claiming the authority to detain not only persons who were “part of” 
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to baseline procedural safeguards—rejecting determinations based on 
absolute secrecy, innuendo, tentativeness, or multiple levels of hearsay, 
while affirming executive branch decisions satisfying minimal standards 
of reliability.9 In the process, the judiciary has rebuffed the President’s 
extreme interpretations of vague authorizing legislation,10 reexamined 
inadequately reasoned decisions by various arms of the executive branch 
in implementing a congressional delegation,11 and stimulated legislative 
action where Congress has failed to oversee executive decision-making 
through the legislative process.12 Throughout these decisions, procedure 
functions as a corrective to decision-making by one (or both) of the 
political branches that, if left undisturbed, would violate a judicially 
imposed standard requiring lucid, intelligible procedures. 
Sometimes judicial review is overtly exacting in these cases, with 
courts imposing burdensome procedural obligations on a party to 
litigation (usually the government).13 Other times the review is relatively 
light—as in the imposition of a relaxed standard of review when ruling 
on an enemy combatant designation—but heavy enough to invalidate 
executive branch decisions lacking sufficient indicia of reliability.14 Still 
other times the review is moderately demanding, requiring a co-equal 
branch to reconsider its interpretation of a statute (in the case of the 
Executive)15 or to reaffirm its position through clear and more 
purposeful language (in the case of the legislature).16 These varying 
procedural demands are generally consistent with the deference norms 
that obtain under prevailing doctrine,17 but they impose enhanced 
procedural conditions that require the political branches to satisfy a 
judicially imposed level of transparency and deliberation—conditions 
                                                     
but also those that “substantially supported” the Taliban, al-Qaida, or other associated forces and 
recognizing the ambiguousness of the phrase “substantially supported” and its potentially broad 
application). For a discussion of the previous definition of “enemy combatant,” see infra note 150. 
9. See infra Part II.A.2. 
10. See infra Part II.B.1. 
11. See infra Part II.B.2. 
12. See infra Part II.B.3. 
13. See infra Part II.A.1. 
14. See infra Part II.A.2. 
15. See infra notes 149–52, 163–68 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra Part II.B.3. 
17. See infra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
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that make procedural review far more muscular than might otherwise be 
expected. 
Muscular procedure highlights a process-oriented approach18 to legal 
decision-making in national security through a judicial insistence on 
procedural regularity, a matter over which the judiciary has a 
comparative advantage in expertise.19 The theory presents an alternative 
to much of the conventional wisdom within the relevant literature. 
Although the prevailing frameworks advocate either blind deference to 
the collective expertise of the political branches or judicial resolution of 
large, complex, and highly fractious substantive questions, courts have 
put procedure to muscular uses by focusing on the means of coordinate 
branch decision-making, while still allowing the political branches to 
define the content of the substantive law. The cases discussed in this 
article, by integrating baseline procedural standards into cases of inter-
branch importance, present new ways of thinking about the relationship 
between judicial decision-making and procedural values such as 
transparency and deliberation, with implications beyond the national 
security context.20 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I reviews the debate within 
the post-9/11 literature regarding the proper judicial role in resolving the 
tension between individual liberty and the President’s claimed security 
needs. Some scholars advance the view that procedural devices merely 
delay resolutions and that courts should decide an array of substantive 
policy questions, while others argue for the virtual elimination of 
judicial review where Congress and the President agree on a particular 
policy pronouncement. The balance of this Article seeks to challenge 
these conceptions of judicial review, both descriptively and normatively. 
                                                     
18. The legal process school of thought was first advanced during the 1940s and 1950s by 
commentators who emphasized the “relative institutional competence of courts, legislatures and 
agencies to make and implement social policy decisions.” Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, 
Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate 
Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 407. Legal process scholars tend to stress the 
judiciary’s relative advantage in deciding procedural matters and comparative disadvantage in 
deciding questions of substantive policy decisions, about which the democratically elected branches 
have greater expertise. See id.; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical 
and Critical Introduction to THE LEGAL PROCESS, HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE 
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at li (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and 
Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 972–76 (1994). 
19. See infra notes 215–17 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra Part IV.B.  
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Part II develops a framework of muscular procedure by exploring 
decisions that condition judicial deference on the Executive’s adherence 
to a judicially imposed standard of transparency and deliberation. Within 
that framework, procedure can perform different functions. In individual 
cases, courts can invoke procedural devices to precipitate detainee 
releases,21 guide merits determinations,22 halt the return of detainees to 
countries where they fear torture,23 and endorse efforts by litigants to 
invoke additional procedural rules in aid of their respective claims or 
defenses.24 More broadly, courts can use procedural rulings to reject 
decision-making by the coordinate branches that lacks professional 
judgment—including occasions when the President overreaches in 
interpreting a statutory mandate,25 when various arms of the executive 
branch fail to manage their own internal processes of review,26 or when 
Congress abdicates its responsibility to oversee executive branch 
decision-making through clear legislation.27 The cases demonstrate how 
judicial decisions about procedural rules can have a far greater effect on 
the substantive law than many commentators have recognized. 
Part III moves to a normative discussion by demonstrating how the 
framework of muscular procedure sheds light on the leading scholarly 
positions regarding the proper judicial role in resolving the conflict 
between liberty and security. That scholarship generally treats 
procedural resolutions as inferior substitutes for substantive decisions or 
presents an overly formal or idealized account of procedure’s 
appropriate role. Muscular procedure, by contrast, demonstrates how a 
process-oriented approach to decision-making in the national security 
context can have the type of concrete effects on the law championed by 
civil libertarian scholars, without treading into purely substantive areas 
of law generally seen as the province of the political branches.  
Part IV extends that normative discussion by considering the value of 
procedural decisions in the national security context, contrasting the 
specific function of muscular procedure with other procedural devices 
                                                     
21. See infra note 69 and accompanying text; infra Part II.A.1. 
22. See infra Part II.A.2. 
23. See infra Part II.A.3. 
24. See infra Part II.A.4. 
25. See infra Part II.B.1. 
26. See infra Part II.B.2. 
27. See infra Part II.B.3. 
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that, when applied within immigration law, also express the judiciary’s 
commitment to deeper rule-of-law values. Within these different legal 
frameworks, courts use transparency and deliberation requirements to 
insist on an enhanced procedural regularity in political branch decision-
making, without rejecting outright political branch expertise on 
substance. This process-based approach clarifies the role of the judiciary 
based on its comparatively greater expertise in procedure. 
I.  CRITICISM OF THE 9/11 DECISIONS AS MERE PROCEDURE 
While some commentators have hailed the Supreme Court’s executive 
detention cases as watersheds,28 others see them “less like landmarks and 
more like small signposts directing the traveler to continue toward an 
eventual, more significant fork in the road.”29 In some ways, each 
critique hits its mark. But, landmarks or not, the cases demonstrate a 
form of procedural review that has surprisingly muscular implications. 
To understand how, it is useful first to recap briefly the Supreme Court 
holdings and subsequent criticism. 
A.  The Supreme Court’s Decisions from Rasul to Boumediene 
In 2004, the Court issued three major decisions regarding executive 
detention. Rasul v. Bush30 held that alien detainees at Guantánamo could 
invoke the federal habeas corpus statute to challenge their confinement, 
but offered nothing (save a cryptic footnote)31 about the scope of their 
constitutional rights in habeas.32 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,33 the Court 
                                                     
28. See Ronald Dworkin, Why It Was a Great Victory, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Aug. 14, 2008, at 
18, 18 (calling Boumediene “one of the most important Supreme Court decisions in recent years” 
and “a landmark change in our constitutional practice”); see also Emily Calhoun, The Accounting: 
Habeas Corpus And Enemy Combatants, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 77, 78 (2008) (“From Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld to Rasul v. Bush to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court has protected individuals’ 
access to federal courts to challenge the constitutionality of unilateral executive detention. This 
access has justifiably been celebrated by advocates for alleged enemy combatants.”). 
29. Martinez, supra note 1, at 1029; see generally supra note 1. 
30. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
31. Id. at 483 n.15 (“Petitioners’ allegations—that, although they have engaged neither in combat 
nor in acts of terrorism against the United States, they have been held in executive detention for 
more than two years in territory subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the 
United States, without access to counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoing—
unquestionably describe ‘custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 
States.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006))). 
32. Id. at 485 (“Whether and what further proceedings may become necessary after respondents 
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determined that the President could detain a U.S. citizen enemy 
combatant but had to provide him with a due process hearing before a 
neutral decision-maker.34 The Court provided little detail regarding the 
contours of that hearing, which was left in the hands of the executive 
branch.35 In Padilla v. Rumsfeld,36 the Court held that a U.S. citizen 
enemy combatant had filed his petition in the wrong judicial district.37 
The Court did not make an inquiry into the legality of Padilla’s 
detention; it merely resolved a jurisdictional question, requiring Padilla 
to lodge a fresh petition in a different federal court.38 
In 2006, the Court held in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld39 that the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice and Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions, which applies to an armed conflict with a foreign terrorist 
organization, did not authorize the Guantánamo military commissions.40 
However, the Court’s ruling implied that Congress could reauthorize the 
                                                     
make their response to the merits of petitioners’ claims are matters that we need not address now. 
What is presently at stake is only whether the federal courts have jurisdiction to determine the 
legality of the Executive’s potentially indefinite detention of individuals who claim to be wholly 
innocent of wrongdoing.”); see Fiss, supra note 1, at 245–46 (“Although the Rasul Court ruled that 
the prisoners had a right to file a habeas application in a federal district court and to require a 
response by the government, it did not specify what further rights—procedural or substantive—they 
had before that court. Even more significantly, the Court grounded the limited right it did provide in 
the federal habeas statute, not the Constitution, and left uncertain whether the prisoners had any 
constitutional rights that might be vindicated in the habeas proceeding it allowed. The Court simply 
granted the prisoners the right to file a piece of paper.”). 
33. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
34. Id. at 509. 
35. See Martinez, supra note 1, at 1048 (“[The Court] left a great deal undecided. For example, 
[it] did not specify in any detail what procedures should be used in the hearing on remand. Could 
Hamdi call witnesses? Would the government be required to produce witnesses if Hamdi wanted to 
cross examine them? Would the government be required to provide other forms of discovery to 
Hamdi? Who would have the burden of proof, and what would that burden be?”). Also left 
unaddressed in Hamdi was the range of individuals that the Executive could hold as enemy 
combatants, which the Court explicitly left to “be defined by the lower courts as subsequent cases 
are presented to them.” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 522 n.1. 
36. 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
37. Id. at 442, 451. 
38. Id. at 446, 451; see Martinez, supra note 1, at 1038 (“From a normative perspective, the 
Padilla case is troubling. . . . [T]he practical effect . . . was to enable the government to keep Padilla 
isolated and subject to coercive interrogation for twenty-one months, and to keep him in military 
custody for a total of forty-three months on uncertain legal grounds.”).  
39. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
40. Id. at 624–33. 
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Executive’s favored commissions through a statute,41 and Congress 
followed suit by enacting the Military Commissions Act (MCA).42 In 
2008, the Court ruled in Boumediene v. Bush43 that constitutional habeas 
protections applied at Guantánamo Bay, restoring the detainees’ access 
to the Great Writ to challenge their confinement.44 Boumediene also 
invalidated jurisdiction-stripping legislation, ruled that a congressional 
act violated the Constitution’s Suspension Clause, and found that a 
policy created by the legislative and executive branches exceeded their 
collective constitutional authority.45 However, the Court explicitly left 
untouched “the content of the law that governs petitioners’ detention.”46 
Boumediene, like the four previous executive detention cases to come 
before the Court, decided threshold issues of law while deliberately 
leaving unresolved a host of additional questions.47 
                                                     
41. As Justice Breyer noted in his Hamdan concurrence, “[n]othing prevents the President from 
returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes is necessary.” 548 U.S. at 636 (Breyer, J., 
concurring); id. at 637 (“If Congress, after due consideration, deems it appropriate to change the 
controlling statutes, in conformance with the Constitution and other laws, it has the power and 
prerogative to do so.”); see also Martinez, supra note 1, at 1029–30 (“In its decision in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld . . . the Supreme Court minimized the impact of its decision on national security by 
referring in an almost offhand way to the possibility that Congress could simply change the rules to 
allow military commissions.”). 
42. Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. 
43. 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
44. Id. at 2262 (“We hold that Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo 
Bay.”). 
45. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 259, 260–61 (2009) (“[F]or the first time in history the Court found it necessary to 
strike down a statute as violating the Suspension Clause, rather than construe it to avoid 
invalidity.”); see also Cole, supra note 1, at 47–48 (“First, for the first time in its history, the 
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a law enacted by Congress and signed by the president on 
an issue of military policy in a time of armed conflict . . . . Second, and also for the first time, the 
Court extended constitutional protections to noncitizens outside U.S. territory during 
wartime . . . . Third, the Court declared unconstitutional a law restricting federal court 
jurisdiction.”). 
46. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2277. The Court called it “a matter yet to be determined.” Id. 
47. See Cole, supra note 1, at 56 (“[Boumediene] leaves government officials guessing as to 
which, if any, constitutional constraints will apply to official action abroad, and gives the Court a 
relatively free hand in future cases.”); Matthew C. Waxman, Administrative Detention Of 
Terrorists: Why Detain, And Detain Whom?, 3 J. OF NAT’L SEC. L. & POL. 1, 2 (forthcoming 2009) 
(“The [Boumediene] Court expressly left unresolved important substantive questions such as the 
scope of the Executive’s power to detain, and delegated to lower courts resolution of the procedural 
issues likely to arise in hundreds of resulting habeas petitions.”). 
Landau_DTPed.doc (Do Not Delete) 11/11/2009 10:16 PM 
Muscular Procedure 
671 
B. Scholarly Criticism of the Court’s Procedural Decisions 
Civil libertarianism and “bilateral endorsement”48 represent the two 
leading theories that have emerged in light of the Court’s decisions. 
While both conceptions of judicial review advance at least some role for 
the courts in deciding questions of national security—only a third 
position, executive unilateralism, rejects judicial review entirely49—they 
take very different approaches to the issue of how courts should decide 
the substance of the liberty/security debate. 
Civil libertarians argue that courts should decide substantive claims, 
and they tend to criticize the five recent Supreme Court decisions for 
leaving unresolved questions such as the proper definition of the term 
“enemy combatant,” the presumptive period that such individuals can be 
held without formal charge, and the scope of their constitutional rights.50 
Jenny Martinez argues, for example, that the pre-Boumediene decisions 
have “resulted in a great deal of process, and not much justice.”51 Owing 
to the procedural nature of many of the post-9/11 decisions, “so little 
seems to have been decided”52 because the Court “left the final, 
substantive outcome of the cases at bar uncertain.”53 Muneer Ahmad 
                                                     
48. Issacharoff and Pildes use “bilateral endorsement” generally to advance a descriptive project. 
See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 2, at 27, 33, 35. Posner and Sunstein champion bilateral 
endorsement (or something very similar to it) on normative grounds as the ideal role for the courts 
in times of crisis. See Posner, supra note 2, at 34; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 50. 
49. Executive unilateralists reject almost any role for judicial review of executive branch 
decisions on matters of national security, arguing that courts should yield entirely to the political 
branches, which are more ably equipped to manage questions of individual liberty during times of 
crisis. For a description of the executive unilateralist position, see, for example, Issacharoff & 
Pildes, supra note 2, at 4. Issacharoff and Pildes characterize executive unilateralists as “advocates 
of national security” who, “[r]easoning from the correct starting point that these contexts necessitate 
a greater degree of the distinct qualities the executive branch tends to possess . . . conclude that 
unilateral executive discretion, not subject to oversight from other institutions, is required.” Id. The 
Supreme Court has resoundingly rejected that approach, and it will not be considered at great length 
here. See infra note 137 and accompanying text. 
50. See Fiss, supra note 1, at 245–46; id. at 256 (“What is missing from this calculus, and in my 
judgment from all three of these much celebrated cases [Rasul, Hamdi and Padilla] . . . is a full 
appreciation of the value of the Constitution—as a statement of the ideals of the nation and as the 
basis of the principle of freedom—and even more, a full appreciation of the fact that the whole-
hearted pursuit of any ideal requires sacrifices, sometimes quite substantial ones.”); Martinez, supra 
note 1, at 1028 (“Each of these decisions [Rasul, Hamdi, Padilla, Hamdan] focused primarily on 
issues of process, while more substantive questions were left lurking in the background.”). 
51. Martinez, supra note 1, at 1092. 
52. Id. at 1032. 
53. Id. at 1029. 
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argues that “[w]hile commentators can point to an unbroken record of 
legal victories” from Rasul through Boumediene, “the view from the 
prisoners’ perspective is quite different, and throws into question the 
claim of transformative legal practice that the Court cases might 
otherwise suggest.”54 
Bilateral endorsement, by contrast, takes a “process-based, 
institutionally-oriented (as opposed to rights-oriented) [approach to] . . . 
examining the legality of governmental action in extreme security 
contexts.”55 Its adherents argue that judicial intervention is unnecessary 
and inappropriate where the executive and legislative branches agree on 
a common course of action.56 This “minimalist approach to intrusions on 
freedom amidst war”57 defers to the greater institutional capability of the 
political branches to decide national security policy given the “different 
democratic pedigrees, different incentives, and different interests to 
which they respond.”58 Bilateral endorsement tends to reinforce the 
framework advanced by Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,59 according to which courts 
review executive action for coordinated efforts between the legislative 
and executive branches.60 
                                                     
54. Ahmad, supra note 1, at 4.  
55. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 2, at 5. 
56. Id. at 8 (noting the “role of Congress as a partner in the determination of the nature and scope 
of national emergency”). Cass Sunstein, moreover, emphasizes the role of Congress as an important 
actor in responding to national security crises and an institution capable of providing “a check on 
unjustified intrusions on liberty” during times of crisis. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 54. 
57. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 50. Under a minimalist jurisprudence, judges decide no more than 
necessary to resolve the case at hand by avoiding any resolution of questions that could create, or 
complicate, other cases. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM 
ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). Minimalism is often discussed within the context of Alexander 
Bickel’s “passive virtues,” according to which courts decide questions of procedure and jurisdiction 
before turning to merits adjudications. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—
Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). 
58. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 2, at 5; see also Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1176 (2007) (noting broad deference to 
the executive branch based on its foreign policy expertise). 
59. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
60. See id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson draws an inverse relationship between 
judicial review and legislative endorsement, arguing that executive acts based on an express 
congressional grant are entitled “the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial 
interpretation,” while executive action lacking congressional backing will be “scrutinized with 
caution.” Id. at 637–38. In the “absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority,” the 
President acts within a “zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, 
or in which its distribution is uncertain.” Id. at 637. Sunstein argues that Jackson’s model “captures 
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C. The Effect of Procedural Decisions on Detainee Releases 
Civil libertarian critics, some of whom write from the detainees’ 
perspectives,61 note that procedural decisions often create uncertainty in 
the law and delay final resolutions.62 They observe that procedure can 
prolong the confinement of detainees who may be innocent.63 But the 
data on Guantánamo releases sheds a different light on that analysis. 
Very few detainees released from Guantánamo have been transferred 
after a judicial order resolving the merits64 of a case: only eleven of the 
thirty detainees who have been ordered released at the conclusion of a 
full merits hearing65 have been transferred from Guantánamo.66 
                                                     
the practices of the American courts when national security is threatened.” Sunstein, supra note 2, at 
50–51; see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Hamdi Meets Youngstown: Justice Jackson’s Wartime 
Security Jurisprudence and the Detention of “Enemy Combatants,” 68 ALA. L. REV. 1127, 1128 
(2005) (“Justice Jackson’s concurrence . . . established the starting framework for analyzing all 
future foreign relations and individual liberties problems.”); Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 2, at 5 
(noting that in times of crisis courts have deferred to executive decisions couched within 
congressional authorization and that “[c]ontrary to the modern civil libertarian stance, the American 
courts have only rarely addressed these issues through the framework of individual constitutional 
rights”); cf. Adrian Vermeule, Holmes On Emergencies, 61 STAN. L. REV. 163, 175 (2008) (“[T]he 
passive virtues . . . [and] . . . judicial minimalism . . . are sometimes said to apply even more 
strongly during emergencies; on this view the higher stakes of emergency decisions, the 
inflammation of public passions, and the possibility of setting bad precedents under the pressure of 
extraordinary circumstances all counsel courts to keep a low profile until the emergency has 
passed.”). 
61. See Ahmad, supra note 1, at 4; supra text accompanying note 54; see also infra notes 62–63 
and accompanying text. 
62. Martinez, for example, argues that “substantive and procedural law may be left in a more 
uncertain state as a result” of the Court’s post-9/11 decisions. Martinez, supra note 1, at 1091. 
63. See id. at 1031 (“The prevalence of procedural rulings in the ‘war on terror’ cases thus has 
significant implications for substantive rights in at least two ways. First, by delaying ultimate 
resolution of rights claims, it has allowed serious violations of human rights to continue for years. 
Second, this approach has foreclosed many rights-based challenges without actually considering the 
merits of those challenges.”); id. at 1017 (“[T]he focus on process rather than substance comes at a 
human cost.”); see also Ahmad, supra note 1, at 4; supra text accompanying note 54. 
64. It should be noted that a favorable decision on the merits is not necessarily exoneration. Thus, 
a ruling by a district court that a detainee must be released because he is improperly held as an 
enemy combatant does not necessarily revoke the original enemy combatant label. 
65. Al Rabiah v. U.S., No. 02-828, 2009 WL 3083077, at *27 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2009) (Kollar-
Kotelly, J.), ordered the release of Fouad Mahmoud Al Rabiah. Al Rabiah remains at Guantanamo. 
Al-Adahi v. Obama, No. 05-280, 2009 WL 2584685, at *16 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2009) (Kessler, J), 
ordered the release of Mohammed Al-Adahi. Al-Adahi remains at Guantanamo. Bacha v. Obama, 
No. 05-2385, 2009 WL 2365846, at *1 (D.D.C. July 30, 2009) (Huvelle, J.), ordered the release of 
Mohammed Jawad. Jawad was returned to his native Afghanistan on August 24, 2009. Al Mutairi v. 
U.S., No. 02-828, 2009 WL 2364173, at *15 (D.D.C. July 29, 2009) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.), ordered the 
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Moreover, many of the 552 releases67 so far have occurred after a 
procedural ruling.68 Hamdi exemplifies this latter point: shortly after the 
Court required the executive branch to provide Hamdi a due process 
hearing, the government chose to release him.69 Although Hamdi was 
denied any opportunity to disprove his enemy combatant status,70 he was 
                                                     
release of Khalid Abdullah Mishal Al Mutairi. He was transferred to Kuwait on Oct. 13, 2009. Al 
Ginco v. Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 130 (D.D.C. June 22, 2009) (Leon, J.), ordered the release of 
Abdulrahim Abdul Razak al Ginco (the name can also be spelled “Janko”). Al Ginco remains 
imprisoned at Guantánamo. Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 66 (D.D.C. May 11, 2009), 
ordered the release of Alla Ali Bin Ali Ahmed. Ahmed remains imprisoned at Guantánamo. 
Basardh v. Bush, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2009) (Huvelle, J.), ordered the release of 
Yasin Muhammed Basardh. Basardh remains imprisoned at Guantánamo. El Gharani v. Bush, 593 
F. Supp. 2d 144, 149 (D.D.C. Jan. 14, 2009) (Leon, J.), ordered the release of Mohammed El 
Gharani. El Gharani was released to Chad on June 11, 2009. Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 
191, 198–99 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2008) (Leon, J.), ordered that Lakhdar Boumediene, Mohamed 
Nechla, Hadj Boudella, Ait Idir, and Saber Lahmar be released. Boumediene was released on May 
15, 2009 to France. Nechla, Boudella, and Idir were released to Bosnia and Herzegovina on 
December 16, 2008. Lahmar remains imprisoned at Guantánamo. In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee 
Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 43 (D.D.C. Oct. 8, 2008), ordered the release of seventeen Uighur 
detainees. The D.C. Circuit reversed that opinion, and the Supreme Court granted the petition for 
certiorari. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3577 
(U.S. Oct. 20, 2009) (No. 08-1234). On June 11, 2009, four of these seventeen—Abdul Nassir, 
Huzaifa Parhat, Jalal Jalaldin, and Abdul Semet—were released and transferred to Bermuda. 
 For release information concerning all of the Guantánamo detainees discussed in this footnote, 
see The Guantánamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo?scp=4& 
sq=guantanamo&st=cse (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). 
66. This is because, in many cases, the government simply ignores a judicial order directing the 
release of a detainee—despite a stated desire to comply with those orders and the larger goal of 
closing the Guantánamo facility. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on 
National Security (May 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ 
Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-Security-5-21-09/ (“The courts have spoken. They have 
found that there’s no legitimate reason to hold 21 of the people currently held at Guantanamo . . . . I 
cannot ignore these rulings because as President, I too am bound by the law. The United States is a 
nation of laws and so we must abide by these rulings.”). 
67. As of October 20, 2009, 221 detainees remained in custody (six have died while imprisoned 
at Guantánamo). See The Guantánamo Docket, supra note 65. 
68. See infra note 69 and accompanying text; infra Part II.A.1. 
69. Jerry Markon, Hamdi Returned to Saudi Arabia: U.S. Citizen’s Detention as Enemy 
Combatant Sparked Fierce Debate, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2004, at A2. 
70. See Peter Irons, “The Constitution Is Just a Scrap of Paper”: Empire Versus Democracy, 73 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1081, 1097 (2005) (“In September 2004, bowing to the Supreme Court’s ruling, the 
Bush administration grudgingly released Hamdi from the Navy brig . . . . Whether he was innocent 
of any terrorist acts, of course, was a question the Bush administration refused to permit a court to 
decide.”); see also Emily Calhoun, The Accounting: Habeas Corpus and Enemy Combatants, 79 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 77, 104 (2008) (“[Hamdi’s] release suggests the executive was more worried about a 
public accounting than about the fate of Hamdi as an individual.”). 
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spared the near-certainty of remaining in detention throughout trial and a 
likely period of extended confinement during a protracted appellate 
process. 
While advocates claim that the rule of law will be better served 
through decisions resolving substantive legal questions, there is no 
guarantee that substantive rulings would redound to the benefit of the 
causes they champion. Moreover, procedural rulings have provided 
critical remedies in contexts where substantive law is generally 
unavailing, as for instance where detainees have sought judicial 
protection against torture overseas.71 It would not be a stretch therefore 
to argue that many of the detainees—if they could choose—might be 
better off with a procedural resolution than a decision of substance.72 
Beyond the debate about the relative merits and deficiencies of 
“procedural” versus “substantive” decisions lies a deeper point about the 
role of certain procedural values in precisely the types of complex and 
highly charged scenarios raised within the executive detention context. 
Where courts have placed a premium on coordinate branch adherence to 
procedural ideas such as deliberation, transparency, and accountability, 
judicial decisions have had a forceful effect on the individual cases and 
the law more generally. By invoking these procedural devices, courts 
have brought hundreds of cases to effective resolution. In other cases, 
courts have rebuffed extreme interpretations of statutes by the Executive, 
rejected decision-making by various arms of the executive branch that 
inadequately implemented a congressional delegation, and provided 
executive oversight where Congress failed to do so. This is muscular 
procedure, which provides opportunities for thinking about how 
procedure can affect the law—and substantive rights—in new and 
unexplored ways. 
II.  FROM MERE PROCEDURE TO MUSCULAR PROCEDURE 
In a number of executive detention cases, the Supreme Court and 
lower courts have expressed a willingness to bend to the executive 
                                                     
71. See infra Part II.A.3. 
72. One could even argue that from a detainee’s perspective, procedural victories are preferable 
to a decision on the merits: procedural controversies carry less risk (given the possibility of an 
adverse decision on the merits) and in some cases can lead to a favorable outcome more quickly 
than litigation addressing substantive claims. From the government’s perspective, this outcome 
could be preferable, too, because it avoids the potentiality of a substantive decision invalidating its 
preferred detention policy. 
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branch’s claimed security need, but only on condition that baseline 
procedural standards are satisfied. This conditional deference norm is 
manifested more narrowly when courts require the government to supply 
clearer and more specific evidence to sustain a determination regarding 
an individual detainee. Its broad manifestation occurs when courts 
require greater transparency or deliberation by one or both of the 
coordinate branches, regardless of their apparent agreement on a 
particular policy issue, to protect the integrity of a decision-making 
process that affects large numbers of individuals. Whether narrow or 
broad, muscular procedure ensures meaningful judicial review in 
individual cases while sharpening the judiciary’s institutional role in 
placing checks on coordinate branch overreach. 
A. How Procedural Rules Bring Cases to Resolution 
Courts have invoked procedural devices to accelerate final resolutions 
in large numbers of cases. In some cases, courts have imposed onerous 
discovery burdens on the government, refusing to allow it to assert 
without evidence the dangerousness of a particular detainee. In other 
cases, courts have resolved a merits determination regarding the 
propriety or impropriety of detention by imposing relatively mild 
procedural burdens on the government, while refusing to budge on core 
issues of procedural regularity. Courts have also used procedural rulings 
to block executive action, including the transfer of detainees to third 
countries where they could face torture, even though the substantive law 
appeared to prevent that outcome. Finally, courts have endorsed efforts 
by litigants to invoke additional procedural devices to secure vital 
exculpatory material and other information relevant to their various 
claims and defenses. 
1. Courts Have Accelerated Final Resolutions by Issuing Broad 
Discovery Orders 
In Bismullah v. Gates,73 the D.C. Circuit imposed stiff discovery 
demands on the government in cases brought by enemy combatants 
challenging their confinement at Guantánamo.74 The court held that the 
government would have to supply not only the records compiled by the 
                                                     
73. 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
74. Id. at 180. 
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Guantánamo tribunals, which did not include the full array of 
information from the government’s files, but the entire body of 
information within the government’s possession on each detainee.75 
Bismullah established the scope of the record the D.C. Circuit would 
require for all Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) petitions, and thus the 
decision had broad application.76 In the DTA, Congress attempted to 
eliminate federal jurisdiction over Guantánamo and create an alternate 
process consisting of a hearing before a Guantánamo Combatant Status 
Review Tribunal (CSRT) and a limited federal appeal before the D.C. 
Circuit.77 
The CSRT standards and procedures78 contained a requirement that 
the tribunals obtain all “reasonably available information in the 
possession of the U.S. government bearing on the issue of whether the 
detainee meets the criteria to be designated as an enemy combatant.”79 
This included ordering the appearance of witnesses, including U.S. 
military personnel, when “reasonably available,” and ordering all 
relevant agency files, their “acceptable substitute[s],” or a certification 
that the requested information, if withheld, would not undermine an 
enemy combatant determination.80 But it became apparent during the 
                                                     
75. Id. at 184–86, 192. 
76. Id. at 191.  
77. The Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) amended the general habeas statute (currently codified at 
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)) to require that “no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or 
consider . . . an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by 
the Department of Defense at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba . . . .” DTA, Pub. L. No. 109-148 § 1005(e), 
119 Stat. 2739, 2741–42 (2005). In the DTA, Congress sought to supplant habeas with an 
institutional process at Guantánamo coupled with limited federal review by the D.C. Circuit on only 
two matters: first, whether the Pentagon’s tribunal “was consistent with the standards and 
procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense for Combatant Status Review Tribunals (including 
the requirement that the conclusion of the Tribunal be supported by a preponderance of the evidence 
and allowing a rebuttable presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence),” id. § 
1005(e)(2)(C)(i); and second, “to the extent the Constitution and laws of the United States are 
applicable, whether the use of such standards and procedures to make the determination [was] 
consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States,” id. § 1005(e)(2)(C)(ii). 
78. Standards and practices for those tribunals, including evidence-gathering and other 
requirements, were set forth in two separate memos. See Memorandum from Gordon England, 
Sec’y of the Navy (July 29, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/ 
d20040730comb.pdf [hereinafter England Memorandum]; Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, 
Deputy Sec’y of Def., for the Sec’y of the Navy, (July 7, 2004), available at http:// 
www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf. 
79. England Memorandum, supra note 78, at Enclosure 1 § E(3). 
80. Id. at Enclosure 1 §§ 1(E)(2), 1(E)(3)(a). 
Landau_DTPed.doc (Do Not Delete) 11/11/2009 10:16 PM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 84:661, 2009 
678 
Bismullah litigation that the government had not followed its own 
procedures: tribunals were unable to verify that they had examined all 
the relevant, available information; agencies routinely denied requests 
for confirmation by Guantánamo personnel that the agency had no 
exculpatory information on a particular detainee; and exculpatory 
evidence was withheld from tribunals if it was believed to be 
“duplicative” or “not relat[ing] to a specific allegation being made 
against the detainee.”81 Bismullah, by mandating strict adherence to the 
CSRT procedures, required the government to retrieve anew and 
produce all relevant material, exculpatory and otherwise, with respect to 
each detainee.82 
Although Bismullah merely required the government to do what it had 
promised to do, the decision put the government in a severely weakened 
and defensive position. Because the government had not kept intact the 
full range of information, it argued that it would not be able to comply 
with the discovery order, that it lacked the resources, and that it could 
not go back and retrieve information that may have been initially 
available but was not provided to a given tribunal.83 This emboldened 
counsel for the detainees to seek compromises with the government even 
while most substantive (and many procedural) questions surrounding 
Guantánamo remained unresolved. Since, by the time of the decision, 
many of the detainees had been cleared for release and deemed not to 
pose a threat to the United States,84 the discovery obligations put the 
government in a situation where its best option may have been to pursue 
transfer and resettlement, not additional litigation. While correlation is at 
                                                     
81. Bismullah v. Gates, 514 F.3d 1291, 1295 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Decl. of James M. 
McGarrah, Rear Admiral (Ret.), U.S. Navy ¶¶ 4–6, 10–13 (May 31, 2007)). 
82. Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178, 180 (2007) (“In order to review a Tribunal’s determination 
that, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, a detainee is an enemy combatant, the court must 
have access to all the information available to the Tribunal.”). 
83. See Bismullah v. Gates, 503 F.3d 137, 140 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The Pentagon considered taking 
an option it was given by the D.C. Circuit to reconvene new hearings, as opposed to turning over the 
required information from the hundreds of hearings previously conducted. See William Glaberson, 
New Detention Hearings May Be Considered, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/10/14/us/14cnd-gitmo.html. The government did not ultimately exercise that option. 
84. Farah Stockman, Some Cleared Guantanamo Inmates Stay in Custody—Lawyers call U.S. 
System of Hearings a Sham, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 19, 2007, at A1 (“About a quarter of detainees 
who were cleared to leave Guantanamo Bay prison after hearings in 2005 and 2006 remain in 
custody . . . .”). One well-known case involved seventeen Uighur detainees from China, whom the 
government acknowledged pose no national security threat. See infra notes 89–95 and 
accompanying text.  
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best a crude proxy for causation, it is worth noting that during the five-
month period following the D.C. Circuit’s Bismullah decision, eighty-
four detainees were released.85 
The government fought tooth and nail to overturn Bismullah,86 and it 
indirectly accomplished that mission roughly eighteen months later by 
persuading the D.C. Circuit to relinquish jurisdiction over all DTA 
petitions and to require the detainees to initiate habeas petitions in light 
of the jurisdiction restored by Boumediene.87 Within habeas, the 
government re-litigated the discovery issues and greatly reduced its 
production burdens.88 Even though Bismullah no longer formally 
governs the discovery obligations at Guantánamo, it is a significant 
example of how the courts employed procedural decisions to precipitate 
out-of-court resolutions in individual cases. These procedural holdings, 
                                                     
85. See The Guantánamo Docket, Timeline, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/ 
guantanamo/timeline. Bismullah was decided on July 20, 2007. The figures cited above represent 
the number of releases from August 1, 2007 through December 31, 2007. 
86. The government sought rehearing (and rehearing en banc) of the panel ruling. Rehearing was 
denied, Bismullah, 503 F.3d at 140, and the full court denied rehearing en banc, Bismullah v. Gates, 
514 F.3d 1291, 1293 (2008). Next, the government tried for a stay of the decision while it petitioned 
for certiorari. The panel stayed the government’s discovery obligation to produce additional record 
material while the case was on appeal. Bismullah v. Gates, No. 06-1197, Order at 3–4 (D.C. Cir. 
Feb. 13, 2008). It reinstated its decision establishing procedures for DTA review after Boumediene. 
Bismullah v. Gates, 551 F.3d 1068, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
87. The government successfully argued that the D.C. Circuit’s limited jurisdictional mandate 
under the DTA did not survive Boumediene, and the court held that detainees could proceed 
thereafter only through habeas. Bismullah, 551 F.3d at 1072–73, 1075. By convincing the D.C. 
Circuit to nullify jurisdiction over the DTA in its entirety, the government obtained a pass from 
Bismullah’s discovery obligation, something it had been unable to accomplish through a direct 
challenge of the discovery ruling itself. 
88. By all accounts, the government has fared significantly better in habeas than it had under the 
DTA, prevailing on most of the key procedural matters governing those proceedings (involving 113 
cases and more than 200 detainees). The procedural motions for the cases have been coordinated 
before Senior District Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Judge Hogan’s November 6, 2008 Case 
Management Order sets forth a framework for district judges conducting habeas trials after 
Boumediene (though they are not obligated to follow it), and the Order’s discovery obligations are 
fewer than Bismullah’s. See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-0442, Case 
Management Order at 3 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2008). Under the Case Management Order, “[i]f requested 
by the petitioner, the government shall disclose to the petitioner: (1) any documents or objects in its 
possession that are referenced in the factual return; (2) all statements, in whatever form, made or 
adopted by the petitioner that relate to the information contained in the factual return; and (3) 
information about the circumstances in which such statements of the petitioner were made or 
adopted.” Id. The government also has to provide the “petitioner all reasonably available evidence 
in its possession that tends materially to undermine the information presented to support the 
government’s justification for detaining the petitioner.” Id. at 2. This discovery obligation is 
narrower and less burdensome than what Bismullah required. 
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while less likely to provoke criticism of outright judicial supremacy, 
placed a condition on the DTA that prevented the government from 
using it as a bulwark against meaningful judicial review. 
2. Courts Have Resolved the Merits by Applying Baseline Evidentiary 
Requirements 
In Parhat v. Gates,89 the D.C. Circuit invalidated an enemy combatant 
designation, a decision that applied to sixteen similarly situated 
detainees.90 Parhat focused on the underlying reliability of the 
government’s evidence, which the court refused to credit, even under a 
relatively light standard of review.91 The court left undecided a number 
of substantive questions, including whether the Executive had the 
authority under the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)92 to 
detain individuals such as Parhat, who was held based on supposed 
“affiliations” with an ethnic Uighur independence organization believed 
to have al-Qaida and Taliban “associations.”93 The court found it 
unnecessary to reach the government’s statutory and constitutional 
arguments because of its deeper concern with the CSRT panel’s reliance 
on statements lacking source information or other indicia of reliability.94 
The court held: 
                                                     
89. 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
90. Id. at 850. After the government lost the Parhat litigation, it filed a motion proposing to treat 
sixteen similarly situated detainees in exactly the same way, essentially conceding that it had no 
case against them (or, at least, that it did not want to litigate those cases any further). In re 
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-CV-442, Notice of Status (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2008). The 
detainees moved for an order compelling their release into the United States. The District Court 
granted the motion. In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 43 (D.D.C. 2008). 
The D.C. Circuit reversed. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1032 (D.C. Cir 2009). The D.C. 
Circuit held that district courts cannot order the release of Guantánamo Bay detainees into the 
United States. See infra notes 236–38 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
on October 20, 2009. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 77 
U.S.L.W. 3577 (U.S. Oct. 20, 2009) (No. 08-1234). 
91. The panel applied the DTA’s standard requiring that a CSRT determination be based on “a 
preponderance of the evidence.” DTA § 1005(e)(2)(C)(i), 10 U.S.C. § 801 note (2006). 
92. Pub. L. 107-40 §§ 1–2, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (allowing President George Bush “to use all 
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, 
or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international 
terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”). 
93. Parhat, 532 F.3d at 844, 848. The court also sidestepped whether the President could lawfully 
detain Parhat under his commander-in-chief powers. Id. at 842.  
94. Id. at 844–50. 
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The [government’s] documents make assertions—often in haec 
verba—about activities undertaken by [the ethnic Uighur 
independence organization with which Parhat was believed to be 
associated], and about that organization’s relationship to al 
Qaida and the Taliban. The documents repeatedly describe those 
activities and relationships as having “reportedly” occurred, as 
being “said to” or “reported to” have happened, and as things 
that “may” be true or are “suspected of” having taken place. But 
in virtually every instance, the documents do not say who 
“reported” or “said” or “suspected” those things. Nor do they 
provide any of the underlying reporting upon which the 
documents’ bottom-line assertions are founded, nor any 
assessment of the reliability of that reporting. Because of those 
omissions, the Tribunal could not and this court cannot assess 
the reliability of the assertions in the documents. And because of 
this deficiency, those bare assertions cannot sustain the 
determination that Parhat is an enemy combatant.95 
At least one federal district court conducting habeas review has used 
Parhat-style analysis to rule on the propriety or impropriety of detention 
in a number of cases. District Judge Richard J. Leon has resolved a 
number of the Boumediene petitions on remand by analyzing the 
transparency and external verifiability of the government’s evidence.96 
Although Judge Leon had ruled previously that the detainees lacked any 
cognizable rights under statutory habeas97—suggesting dim prospects for 
the detainees’ claims—he resolved the underlying merits of the petitions 
before him, determining that detention was improper in five of the cases, 
and proper in the sixth.98 
The government alleged that all six petitioners had planned a trip to 
Afghanistan in late 2001 to take up arms against U.S. and allied forces, 
and it supported that claim with one piece of evidence: “a classified 
                                                     
95. Id. at 846–47 (footnotes omitted). 
96. See Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 2008). Six of Judge Leon’s cases were 
consolidated with the petitions in the In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases before the D.C. Circuit in 
Boumediene, and reversed on appeal by the Supreme Court. 
97. Judge Leon concluded that the detainees lacked any cognizable constitutional rights that 
could be vindicated through habeas. See Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 314 (D.D.C. 2005) 
(Leon, J.). Another judge held by contrast that the detainees enjoyed Fifth Amendment due process 
protections. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 464 (D.D.C. 2005) (Green, 
J.). 
98. Boumediene, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 198. 
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document from an unnamed source” lacking in “information to 
adequately evaluate the credibility and reliability of this source’s 
information.”99 The government provided no indication of “the 
circumstances under which the source obtained the information as to 
each petitioner’s alleged knowledge and intentions.”100 Under such 
circumstances, Judge Leon held that the government could not sustain its 
relatively low burden to justify holding the five men for whom the 
alleged trip to Afghanistan constituted the exclusive basis for their 
detention: 
Because I cannot, on the record before me, adequately assess the 
credibility and reliability of the sole source information relied 
upon, for five of the petitioners, to prove an alleged plan by 
them to travel to Afghanistan to engage U.S. and coalition 
forces, the Government has failed to carry its burden with 
respect to these petitioners . . . . To allow enemy combatancy to 
rest on so thin a reed would be inconsistent with this Court’s 
obligation under the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi to 
protect petitioners from the risk of erroneous detention.101 
Judge Leon explicitly declined to address the meaning of “directly 
support[ing] hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces”102 (the basis of the 
men’s classification as enemy combatants at Guantánamo despite their 
lack of direct membership in al-Qaida or the Taliban); the substantive 
question whether a mere plan unaccompanied by concrete acts to travel 
to Afghanistan to take up arms is, as a matter of law, “supporting” al-
Qaida under the operative definition of “enemy combatant”; or the scope 
of the detainees’ constitutional and procedural protections.103 Upon 
resolving the definition of “enemy combatant,”104 he applied the light 
preponderance standard to the facts placed in evidence, resolving the 
merits of each case.105 
                                                     
99. Id. at 197. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
102. Id. at 196 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 135 (D.D.C. 2008)). 
103. Id. at 197. 
104. See Boumediene, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 135. 
105. Boumediene, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 195–96. Emily Calhoun has argued that the government 
should be placed under heavy burdens of proof. See Calhoun, supra note 70, at 79, 81, 91; see also 
Benjamin J. Priester, Return of the Great Writ: Judicial Review, Due Process, and the Detention of 
Alleged Terrorists as Enemy Combatants, 37 RUTGERS L. J. 39, 91–92 (2005) (arguing that the 
language of the federal habeas corpus statute puts the burden of proof on the government to justify 
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These cases were by no means simple, involving substantial briefing 
on a variety of questions and often requiring extensive hearings.106 But 
Judge Leon reached the merits of the six cases before him—invalidating 
enemy combatant designations and ordering release in five of them—by 
insisting on a standard of thoroughness and transparency that the 
government was unable or unwilling to meet.107 This approach, which 
has been applied by other habeas judges,108 could prove useful in 
resolving the remaining habeas cases, which, in the wake of 
Boumediene, involved more than 200 detainees.109 
3. Courts Have Used Procedural Rules to Protect Detainees from 
Torture Overseas 
In Belbacha v. Bush,110 the D.C. Circuit held that district courts could 
grant preliminary injunctions blocking the transfer of detainees to 
countries where they faced a risk of torture upon repatriation.111 This 
decision had seemed unlikely, if not impossible, because when Belbacha 
was under consideration, the law of the D.C. Circuit rejected any basis 
of federal jurisdiction over Guantánamo.112 At that point, its ruling had 
                                                     
detention). 
106. The government’s factual return in one case contained roughly 650 pages of exhibits and a 
53-page narrative setting forth the basis upon which the government justified holding six 
Guantánamo detainees. Boumediene, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 195. The petitioners’ traverse contained 
approximately 1,650 pages of exhibits and a 200-page narrative. Id. A hearing on the proper 
definition of “enemy combatant” took nearly four-and-one-half hours. Id. at 193. 
107. Judge Leon has moved more quickly on his cases, in part because he refused to allow them 
to be coordinated with more than 200 other habeas cases for resolution of administrative and 
procedural matters (discussed supra note 88). See Rules Set for 113 Detainee Cases, 
SCOTUSBLOG.COM, Nov. 6, 2008, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/rules-set-for-113-detainee-cases/ 
(noting that “Judge Leon is one of two judges who have refused to send their cases to [Judge] 
Hogan for coordination”). District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan also chose to process his own cases. 
See Analysis: Core of the Habeas Dispute, SCOTUSBLOG.COM, Aug. 2, 2008, http://www.scotusblog. 
com/wp/analysis-core-of-the-habeas-dispute/. 
108. In many of the cases, judges have resolved the merits of detainee challenges by using an 
approach similar to that of Judge Leon. See cases cited supra note 65. 
109. See Sweeping Challenge to Detainee Process, SCOTUSBLOG.COM, Nov. 18, 2008, http:// 
www.scotusblog.com/wp/sweeping-challenge-to-detainee-process/ (noting “113 cases involving 
some 200 prisoners [yet] to go forward . . . in District Court”). 
110. 520 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
111. Id. at 458–59. 
112. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 994 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 
2229, 2277 (2008). 
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yet to be reversed by the Supreme Court in Boumediene. But that 
jurisdictional bar did not prevent the Belbacha panel majority from 
exercising jurisdiction and temporarily halting the transfer of a detainee 
who alleged he would be tortured upon return to his native Algeria.113 
The court reasoned that while the issue of constitutional habeas 
jurisdiction was pending before the Supreme Court, the All Writs Act114 
provided a basis for retaining jurisdiction,115 allowing the court to issue a 
writ to prevent any transfer until the constitutional questions raised in 
the Boumediene appeal were resolved.116 
Belbacha did not explicitly mention concerns with the reliability or 
thoroughness of the government’s repatriation process, though 
Belbacha’s counsel did argue that the diplomatic assurances offered by 
the Algerian government were unreliable given its history of reneging on 
promises to treat other groups of detainees humanely upon their 
return.117 At oral argument, the government was questioned about its 
intentions to transfer Belbacha but refused to comment whether it was 
even considering transferring him, much less where it might send him.118 
In its opinion, the D.C. Circuit raised “the seriousness of the harm 
[Belbacha] claims to face, namely, torture at the hands of a foreign state 
and of a terrorist organization,” a factor the district court on remand 
would have to weigh in its overall assessment of the merits of 
Belbacha’s request for a preliminary injunction.119 Although the district 
                                                     
113. Belbacha, 520 F.3d at 454, 456. The case remains in litigation. See infra note 125 and 
accompanying text. 
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006). 
115. The All Writs Act, initially codified in the Judiciary Act of 1789, provides: “The Supreme 
Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in 
aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” Id. § 1651(a) 
(2006). Under the Act, a court can “avail itself of all auxiliary writs as aids in the performance of its 
duties, when the use of such historic aids is calculated in its sound judgment to achieve the ends of 
justice entrusted to it.” United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172–73 (1977). 
116. The D.C. Circuit determined that “when the Supreme Court grants certiorari to review this 
court’s determination that the district court lacks jurisdiction, a court can, pursuant to the All Writs 
Act . . . and during the pendency of the Supreme Court’s review, act to preserve the status quo in 
other cases raising the same jurisdictional issue if a party satisfies the criteria for issuing a 
preliminary injunction.” Belbacha, 520 F.3d at 457. 
117. Brief for Appellant at 16–18, Belbacha, 520 F.3d 452 (No. 07-5258). 
118. Transcript of Oral Argument at 25–27, Belbacha, 520 F.3d 452 (No. 07-5258). In a related 
case, the D.C. Circuit raised questions during oral argument surrounding the quality of the 
diplomatic assurance process. See infra note 242. 
119. Belbacha, 520 F.3d at 459. 
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court had initially denied relief,120 it issued the injunction when the case 
returned on remand from the D.C. Circuit.121 
The decision temporarily halting Belbacha’s return to Algeria sheds 
light on a larger humanitarian problem involving men who could not 
safely be returned to their home countries,122 and while Belbacha has yet 
to receive much scholarly attention, it speaks to the judiciary’s power to 
slow down the return of detainees when core protections against torture 
are placed into doubt.123 Implicitly, Belbacha raises the possibility of a 
judicial check on the quality of executive branch commitments under 
international law not to return individuals to countries where they face a 
serious risk of torture.124 Although the All Writs Act theoretically 
                                                     
120. Belbacha v. Bush, No. 05-2349, 2007 WL 2422031, at *2 (D.D.C. July 27, 2007). 
121. Bacha v. Bush, No. 05-2349, Order (June 13, 2008) (enjoining the government from 
transferring Belbacha pending resolution of additional legal issues presented by Boumediene). 
122. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Hurdles Frustrate Effort to Shrink Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 9, 2007, at A1. 
123. In a similar group of cases, courts required that the government provide thirty days’ notice 
prior to transferring a detainee from Guantánamo. See infra note 196 and accompanying text. These 
“transfer abeyance” orders allowed for a similar, torture-based challenge should that become 
necessary. However, in 2009 the D.C. Circuit ruled in Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II), 561 F.3d 
509, 515 (D.C. Cir. 2009), that courts could no longer grant these transfer abeyance orders, as doing 
so would interfere on matters of executive prerogative. See infra notes 194–99, 240–42 and 
accompanying text. 
124. The U. N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 
189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention], provides an example of such an executive 
commitment. The United States acceded to the Refugee Convention in 1968. See Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, Nov. 1, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 6223. At the core of its protection, Article 3 of 
the Refugee Convention establishes that “[n]o contracting state shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever” to a country where his “life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of his race, religion, nationality, [or] membership of a particular social group,” an 
obligation that the United States satisfies by providing a form of relief known as withholding of 
removal. 189 U.N.T.S. at 176. The U.N. Convention Against Torture, which the United States 
signed in 1988, prohibits its signatories from sending people to countries where they could face 
torture. U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 114. 
Implementing legislation makes it a matter of U.S. policy “not to expel, extradite, or otherwise 
effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for 
believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture.” The Foreign Affairs Reform 
and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA), Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 
8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2006)). Regulations promulgated under FARRA provide that in the context of 
removal proceedings, the United States is prohibited from sending individuals to countries where 
they are “more likely than not to be tortured.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4) (2008). However, the statute 
expressly disclaims any private right of action. See FARRA § 2242(a), § 2242(d) (stating that this 
“policy” shall not be “construed as providing any court jurisdiction to consider or review claims 
raised under the Convention [Against Torture] or this section . . . except as part of the review of a 
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provides only a temporary solution, Belbacha’s efforts have prevented 
his return to Algeria to this day.125 
4. Courts Have Endorsed Litigants’ Efforts to Invoke Supplemental 
Procedural Devices 
Procedure’s muscularity is equally apparent when one considers 
litigation strategies employing other procedural devices. Detainees were 
able to acquire additional, critical guarantees and safeguards from their 
larger victories: Rasul, for example, not only secured statutory habeas 
rights for Guantánamo detainees but also paved the way for attorney-
client visits,126 a system of legal mail, procedures governing classified 
information (including the granting of security clearances to counsel), 
and other entitlements.127 In addition, detainees benefitted from 
additional procedural mechanisms such as the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA)128 to secure Guantánamo files that the Department of 
Defense attempted to shield from public light.129 Owing to a number of 
FOIA requests lodged by the Associated Press in 2004 and 2005, the 
Department of Defense released transcripts of the tribunal proceedings 
                                                     
final order of removal pursuant to section 242 of the Immigration and Nationality Act”). It has been 
interpreted to create no binding rights for protection from torture outside the limited context of 
removal proceedings in immigration law. See, e.g., Cornejo-Barreto v. Siefert, 379 F.3d 1075, 1086 
(9th Cir. 2004) (“The FARR Act on its face clearly states that it does not create jurisdiction for a 
court to review the . . . application of Article 3 of the Torture Convention.”), vacated as moot, 389 
F.3d 1307 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 
125. The issue remains in litigation. See, e.g., Reply to Government’s Opposition to Motion to 
Govern Further Proceedings, Belbacha v. Obama, 08-5350 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 28, 2009). 
126. See David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantánamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1981, 1988 
(2008). 
127. See In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174 (D.D.C. 2004) (setting forth 
procedures for counsel access to detainees). 
128. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (codified as at amended 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006)). 
129. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Rays of Sunlight in a Shadow “War”: FOIA, the Abuses of Anti-
Terrorism, and the Strategy of Transparency, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1141, 1165 (2007) 
(noting that the success of FOIA litigation “is worthy of remark, given the prior efforts to shield 
Guantanamo from public review” and that “[t]he thousands of pages of transcripts [produced in the 
wake of the litigation] paved the way for analyses casting doubt on the claim that Guantanamo 
housed the ‘worst of the worst,’ even on the government’s evidence”); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary 
Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming March 
2010) (manuscript at 68–69, on file with author) (“Statutes like the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) and government in the sunshine requirements embodied new political demands for open 
government that may have catalyzed judicial procedural developments.”). 
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as well as other documentation detailing detainee conditions of 
confinement and related information.130 
The Guantánamo transcripts secured through FOIA often provided 
important exculpatory evidence, as in Parhat, where counsel brought to 
the court’s attention conflicting evidence from another detainee’s CSRT 
panel on a dispositive point upon which Parhat’s tribunal had relied.131 
That evidence also has value in litigation in other countries, even after 
habeas petitions are conclusively resolved, and even if the Guantánamo 
detention facility is formally retired.132 Many detainees already face 
prosecution overseas once they are transferred into the custody of 
foreign governments.133 Although detainees might not be permitted to 
seek discovery for their foreign criminal cases through their habeas 
actions, given that release from Guantánamo appears to moot those 
cases,134 FOIA and other procedural devices could allow them to obtain 
discovery in aid of their respective defenses.135 
                                                     
130. See Scott Shane, A.C.L.U. Lawyers Mine Documents for Truth, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2009, 
at A4 (noting that efforts through a FOIA detention document request and a subsequent lawsuit 
produced 130,000 pages of previously secret documents over a six-year period). The release of this 
information has made possible empirical studies of hundreds of CSRT proceedings, including the 
work of Mark Denbeaux and Joshua W. Denbeaux, cited infra at note 137, which culled through the 
transcripts made available by FOIA to demonstrate the lack of evidence upon which many of the 
detainees have been held at Guantánamo. 
131. See Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
132. For a discussion of the obstacles standing in the way of President Obama’s promise to close 
Guantánamo, see Joseph Landau, Indefinite Detention Center, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 13, 2008, 
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/indefinite-detention-center. 
133. Detainees can face prosecution under local laws that, unlike U.S. laws, prohibit terrorism 
regardless of where the alleged wrongdoing actually occurred or what nation was allegedly targeted. 
For example, detainees returned to Algeria could face prosecution under Article 87 of the Algerian 
Penal Code, which outlaws membership or association with terrorist associations. See PERMANENT 
MISSION OF ALGERIA TO THE U.N., REPORT SUBMITTED BY ALGERIA TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 1373 (2001), available at 
http://www.algeria-un.org/default.asp?doc=1427 (referencing “Article 1 of Decree No. 93-03, 
reproduced in article 87 bis of Ordinance No. 95.11 of 25 February 1995 amending and 
supplementing Ordinance No. 66.156 of 8 June 1966 enacting the Penal Code” in a discussion of 
the definition of terrorist acts, and noting that such acts include participation or enrollment in 
terrorist organizations even while outside of Algeria). Because a decision ordering release in habeas 
is not necessarily exoneration, see supra note 64, it may be necessary for detainees prosecuted 
overseas to seek exculpatory information regardless of what ensues in their respective habeas cases. 
134. At least one district court within the D.C. Circuit has explicitly refused to continue to 
exercise habeas jurisdiction over a petitioner no longer in custody, despite the possibility of a 
foreign prosecution arising out of incarceration at Guantánamo. See Al Joudi v. Bush, No. 05-CV-
0301, 2008 WL 821884, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2008) (dismissing as “speculative” the claim of a 
detainee transferred to Saudi Arabia who did not face immediate prosecution but who claimed to 
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B. How Procedural Rules Check Insufficient Coordinate Branch 
Decision-Making 
In addition to bringing cases to effective resolution, procedural 
rulings have placed important checks on coordinate branch decision-
making lacking in integrity or professionalism. Courts have conditioned 
deference by requiring a more thorough and searching coordinate branch 
process in the Executive’s interpretations of vague authorizing 
                                                     
face “potential future monitoring by the Saudi Government, travel restrictions, and/or future 
prosecution”); see also Idema v. Rice, 478 F. Supp. 2d 47, 52 (D.D.C. 2007) (noting that the court is 
“keenly aware of case law suggesting that it does not have jurisdiction over a habeas petition 
stemming from a foreign conviction and sentence” except where a habeas petitioner alleges “U.S. 
control over petitioners’ arrest, conviction, appeal, and confinement”). Relatedly, in Qassim v. Bush, 
466 F.3d 1073, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2006), the court held that the voluntary release of two ethnic 
Uighurs to Albania mooted their habeas claim for lack of any collateral consequence flowing out of 
their incarceration at Guantánamo. That court took the approach that the only form of post-relief 
habeas remedy it could recognize is an action for money damages; claims at equity, by contrast, do 
not “survive release from incarceration.” Id. 
135. One little-known procedural device that could be especially useful for obtaining exculpatory 
evidence is 28 U.S.C. § 1782, a statute commonly used in international commercial litigation. 
Detainees could try to invoke Section 1782 to subpoena documents from U.S. personnel who would 
be otherwise immune from suit under U.S. or foreign substantive law, and immune from discovery 
under the law of the foreign forum. Under the statute, “the district court of the district in which a 
person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or a statement or to produce a 
document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal. The order may 
be made . . . upon the application of any interested person and may direct that the testimony or 
statement be given, or the document or other thing be produced, before a person appointed by the 
court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2006). Litigants invoke this statute most frequently in foreign 
commercial litigation, where a party in need of discovery and unable to acquire it under the laws of 
the foreign forum instead seeks U.S. discovery against a person or corporation found within the 
United States. See, e.g., Euromepa, S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 154 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1998). Parties in 
overseas criminal litigation have successfully invoked Section 1782 as well. See, e.g., In re Request 
for Judicial Assistance from the Seoul District Criminal Court, Seoul, Korea, 555 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 
1977). 
Should detainees released from Guantánamo become subject to prosecution overseas, discovery 
orders obtained through Section 1782 could be instrumental in securing exculpatory evidence that 
the U.S. government might otherwise be unwilling to provide. Of course, there are limitations to the 
discovery that can be sought through this vehicle. In Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 
542 U.S. 241 (2004), the Supreme Court articulated a series of comity factors guiding a district 
court’s decision to grant discovery under Section 1782. It also noted that the statute expressly 
shields privileged material. Id. at 260. The government would certainly attempt to quash a subpoena 
on grounds of privilege, though there is no reason why its motion to quash would be granted on that 
basis alone; after all, the government is already being required to provide massive discovery to 
detainees, as evidenced by Bismullah, see supra Part II.A.1, as well as in the post-Boumediene 
habeas cases (though generally less in those cases than what had been ordered in Bismullah), see 
supra note 88. 
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legislation and in its implementation of a congressional delegation. 
Similarly, courts have required that Congress oversee executive branch 
decision-making through clear legislation. These decisions respect the 
expertise of the political branches on substantive policy questions while 
asserting judicial authority over the types of procedural matters where 
courts have a comparative advantage in expertise. 
1. Curbing Executive Branch Overreach 
The Court’s decisions from Rasul through Boumediene reject a type 
of executive overreach that a classic doctrinal procedural approach could 
easily obscure. As a basic matter, the Hamdi Court acknowledged that 
“our Constitution recognizes that core strategic matters of warmaking 
belong in the hands of those who are best positioned and most politically 
accountable for making them,”136 while rejecting the government’s effort 
to “condense power into a single branch of government.”137 Yet the 
                                                     
136. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 531 (2004). Similar statements of deference are found 
throughout prior Supreme Court decisions. See id. at 579–99 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing cases); 
Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (expressing a reluctance “to intrude upon the 
authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs”); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 
57, 64–65 (1981) (“[P]erhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference 
[than in military affairs and national defense].”); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 
668–74 (1981) (holding that despite the lack of explicit congressional authorization for presidential 
action, congressional silence was tantamount to authorization for the purposes of evaluating that 
action under Youngstown’s most deferential standard); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (acknowledging “broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-
to-day fighting in a theater of war”). 
137. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (emphasis omitted). Six Justices concluded that even if the 
Executive had the authority to detain U.S. citizens as enemy combatants, the Constitution imposed 
constraints on that authority, rejecting “the Government’s most extreme . . . argument [that] 
‘[r]espect for separation of powers and the limited institutional capabilities of courts in matters of 
military decision-making in connection with an ongoing conflict’ ought to eliminate entirely any 
individual process, restricting the courts to investigating only whether legal authorization exists for 
the broader detention scheme.” Id. at 527 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 26, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 
507 (No. 03-6696)). Hamdi was consistent with the Court’s other decisions rejecting efforts by the 
Bush Administration to consolidate all national security decision-making within the executive 
branch. In Rasul, for instance, the government argued that “[t]he ‘enemy’ status of aliens captured 
and detained during war is a quintessential political question on which the courts respect the actions 
of the political branches,” and that with respect to these matters, “courts have . . . no judicially-
manageable standards . . . to evaluate or second-guess the conduct of the President or the military.” 
Brief for the Respondent at 35, 37 n.19, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), 
2004 WL 425739; see also id. at 43 (“[E]xercising jurisdiction . . . would thrust the federal courts 
into the extraordinary role of reviewing the military’s conduct of hostilities overseas . . . .”); 
Waxman, supra note 47, at 7 (noting that prior to the Court’s decision in Hamdi, the government 
argued that “the Executive should have unreviewable discretion to decide if an individual falls 
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Court went beyond simply applying standard due process analysis to the 
question of executive detention.  
At first blush, Hamdi seems to have merely applied the seminal (and 
highly deferential) balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge,138 allowing the 
Executive to determine the content of the procedures it would use to vet 
its own enemy-combatant determinations.139 But the Court went much 
further by rejecting the government’s attempt to supply evidence lacking 
in basic indicia of reliability. The Court refused to credit the 
government’s proffered two-page declaration containing generic 
references and hearsay testimony to support Hamdi’s detention, which, 
the Court held, lacked a sufficient foundation on which to accord 
deference to the Executive.140 In the Court’s words, “[a]ny process in 
which the Executive’s factual assertions go wholly unchallenged or are 
simply presumed correct without any opportunity for the alleged 
combatant to demonstrate otherwise falls constitutionally short.”141 For 
the conditions of deference to obtain, the Executive would have to 
satisfy a judicially imposed standard of procedural regularity.142 
                                                     
within the definition of enemy combatant, and that it should have unreviewable discretion to 
determine the scope of the definition itself”); MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA DENBEAUX, NO-
HEARINGS HEARINGS: CRST: THE MODERN HABEAS CORPUS? AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE GOVERNMENT’S COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNALS AT GUANTÁNAMO 4 (2006), 
http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/final_no_hearing_hearings_report.pdf (“As soon 
as most of the CSRT hearings were completed, the Government informed the District Court in 
which the habeas proceedings were pending that, despite the Supreme Court’s ruling, no further 
judicial action was necessary because the detainees had been given CSRT review.”). 
138. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In his Hamdi dissent, Justice Scalia chided the plurality for resolving 
the question by resort to Mathews v. Eldridge, a case he mockingly described as “involving . . . the 
withdrawal of disability benefits!” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 575 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
139. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529–33. Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion left it to the executive 
branch to determine those procedures, noting that the “ongoing military conflict” might require 
vastly curtailed procedural rights. Id. at 533–34 (“Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as 
the most reliable available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding. Likewise, the 
Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence, so 
long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were 
provided.”). The government would also be permitted to use military tribunals in lieu of standard 
civilian courts. See id. at 538. 
140. Id. at 537–38. 
141. Id. at 537. 
142. Boumediene also noted that, throughout history, “it has been possible to leave the outer 
boundaries of war powers undefined,” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 
(2008), but the Court imposed limits on executive detention by subjecting executive branch 
determinations to habeas corpus review in light of shortcomings within the Executive’s process. 
Hamdan also rejected the government’s effort to usurp the judicial role in interpreting statutory and 
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Parhat followed the same approach, conditioning judicial deference 
on a “meaningful review of the record”143 and rejecting efforts by the 
government to furnish the court with materials that failed its baseline test 
for reliability and accuracy, refusing merely to “rubber-stamp the 
government’s charges.”144 While the court sought “neither [to] prescribe 
nor proscribe possible ways in which the government may demonstrate 
the reliability of its evidence,” it “reject[ed] the government’s contention 
that it can prevail by submitting documents that read as if they were 
indictments or civil complaints, and that simply assert as facts the 
elements required to prove that a detainee falls within the definition of 
enemy combatant.”145 The government’s effort to proceed otherwise 
came “perilously close to suggesting that whatever the government says 
must be treated as true, thus rendering superfluous both the role of the 
[CSRT] and the role that Congress assigned to this court.”146 Anything 
less would merely “place a judicial imprimatur on an act of essentially 
unreviewable executive discretion.”147 The district court in Boumediene 
similarly rejected the government’s reliance on an uncorroborated 
intelligence report as conclusive evidence supporting indefinite 
detention. While such information was “sufficient for the intelligence 
purposes for which it was prepared, it is not sufficient for the purposes 
for which a habeas court must now evaluate it.”148 
Hamdi also placed a further check on executive overreach by 
narrowly interpreting executive authority under the AUMF. The Court 
                                                     
treaty law by virtually eliminating federal court second-guessing of executive branch 
interpretations. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy Goes to 
Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 97 (2006) [hereinafter Katyal, Legal Academy] (“[T]he 
government argued that the President’s interpretations of statutory and treaty law were entitled to 
extreme deference.”). 
143. Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 850 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 
178, 180 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 850. 
146. Id. at 849. 
147. Id. at 836. The government also tried to control the public disclosure of unclassified 
information by requiring counsel for the detainees to file certain unclassified information under seal, 
with minimal explanation why information previously deemed unclassified should be kept from 
public disclosure. Id. at 852–53. In Bismullah and Parhat, the D.C. Circuit rejected that effort as an 
attempt to usurp the judicial role by “permitting the government unilaterally to determine whether 
information is ‘protected.’” Id. at 852 (citing Bismullah, 501 F.3d at 188) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
148. Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197 (D.D.C. 2008). 
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noted repeatedly that its holding permitting executive detention applied 
only to “the limited category [of detainees] we are considering,”149 not 
the far broader category of individuals being detained at Guantánamo.150 
This caveat indicated potential problems with the Executive’s attempt to 
use the AUMF as a source of broad detention authority that would bring 
under its ambit individuals with no clear or direct ties to al-Qaida or the 
Taliban.151 As Derek Jinks and Neal Katyal have pointed out, cases such 
as Hamdi, by imposing limits on executive authority under the AUMF, 
“reassured Congress that it can pass something like the AUMF and not 
have it interpreted in ludicrous ways by the executive.”152 
                                                     
149. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004); see also id. at 516 (“We therefore answer 
only the narrow question before us: whether the detention of citizens falling within [the 
government’s narrow] definition is authorized.”). The AUMF was a broad and general endorsement 
for force, not a specific authorization legitimizing indefinite detention, especially in light of the 
countervailing Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2006), which, as noted by two of the 
Justices, requires direct and specific congressional authorization to detain U.S. citizens like Hamdi. 
See id. at 542–46 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment). 
150. The government defined an “enemy combatant” in Hamdi as an individual who was “part of 
or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners” in Afghanistan and who 
“engaged in an armed conflict against the United States.” See id. at 516 (quoting Brief for 
Respondents at 3, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696)). This double requirement effectively made 
battlefield capture a prerequisite to executive detention as an enemy combatant. After Hamdi, the 
government severed the two requirements it had made part of its definition to persuade the Court in 
that case, defining “enemy combatant” as “an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al 
Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its 
coalition partners,” including “any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly 
supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.” Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy 
Sec’y of Def., for the Sec’y of the Navy, at 1 (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink. 
mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf (emphasis added). Severing the two conditions permitted 
the Executive to detain persons with far more attenuated connections to al-Qaida or the Taliban. See 
In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C. 2005) (“[C]ounsel for the 
respondents argued that the Executive has the authority to detain the following individuals until the 
conclusion of the war on terrorism: ‘[a] little old lady in Switzerland who writes checks to what she 
thinks is a charity that helps orphans in Afghanistan but [what] really is a front to finance al-Qaeda 
activities,’ a person who teaches English to the son of an al Qaeda member and a journalist who 
knows the location of Osama Bin Laden but refuses to disclose it to protect her source.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
151. See supra note 150. 
152. Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 
1230, 1276, 1276 n.172 (2007) (citing Hamdi’s reading of the AUMF in light of “longstanding law-
of-war principles,” including the Geneva Conventions); see Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519–21. Although 
the Boumediene Court gestured toward the AUMF as the basis for the confinement of enemy 
combatants at Guantánamo, it sidestepped any inquiry into whether the AUMF was expansive 
enough to cover that far broader definition of “enemy combatant,” declining to “address the content 
of the law that governs petitioners’ detention.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 
2271–72, 2277 (2008). Instead, the Court credited for the sake of argument the government’s 
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This judicial check on executive overreach occurred within a broader 
context of executive unilateralism in surveillance and detention policy. 
Rasul and Hamdi were preceded by the April 24, 2004 revelations about 
the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib.153 Similarly, before the Hamdan 
merits briefs were filed, The New York Times reported that President 
Bush had authorized the National Security Agency to monitor 
Americans in seeming violation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act of 1978.154 Meanwhile, numerous executive branch personnel began 
to express opposition to executive branch polices regarding detention, 
surveillance, and torture.155 This atmosphere sharpened the need for a 
heightened judicial attentiveness to executive branch overreach in 
implementing security-related policy. 
2. Managing Intra-Branch Deliberation 
Courts have also conditioned their deference on a requisite level of 
intra-branch deliberation, including procedural rigor in the 
implementation of security-related policy by various administrative arms 
of the executive branch. Both Boumediene and Bismullah place a 
                                                     
position that the CSRT procedures, and the definition of “enemy combatant” that it employed to 
adjudge enemy combatant determinations, complied with Hamdi. Id. at 2241 (“The Government 
maintains these procedures were designed to comply with the due process requirements identified 
by the plurality in Hamdi.”). 
153. See Katyal, Legal Academy, supra note 142, at 92. 
154. Id. 
155. Examples abound. In one well-known case, Navy Lieutenant Commander Matthew Diaz, 
infuriated at the treatment of the detainees after a six-month tour of duty as a Guantánamo legal 
adviser, anonymously mailed computer printouts containing the detainees’ identities to the Center 
for Constitutional Rights. See Brooks Egerton, Losing a Fight for Detainees, DALLAS MORNING 
NEWS, May 18, 2007, at 18A. Diaz was convicted, sentenced to six months’ imprisonment, and 
dishonorably discharged. See Tim Golden, Naming Names at Gitmo, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 
21, 2007, at 83. Colonel Morris Davis, the former chief prosecutor of the Guantánamo Bay military 
commissions, resigned out of protest over command interference in the commission process and the 
use of evidence obtained by torture. See, e.g., William Glaberson, Ex-Guantanamo Prosecutor to 
Testify for Detainee, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2008, at A18. Susan Crawford, the top military judge 
overseeing the Guantánamo military tribunals, admitted to Bob Woodward that detainee 
Mohammed al-Qahtani had been tortured. William Glaberson, Detainee Was Tortured, a Bush 
Official Confirms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2009, at A22; see also JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR 
PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007) (discussing, inter 
alia, the debate within the Justice Department over the legality of surveillance and interrogation 
policies). For a broader inquiry into the role of government lawyers in resisting the improper 
influence of politics in the content of law, see W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers, 
Democracy, and the Rule of Law, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1333 (2009). 
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judicial check on the managerial competence of the Guantánamo 
tribunals by asserting a role for the courts in curing bureaucratic error. 
The cases were decided after high-ranking personnel disclosed numerous 
administrative mistakes in the implementation of the rules governing 
CSRT tribunals,156 including failures in evidence-gathering and the 
presence of command influence in the decision-making process.157 
Bismullah’s requirement that the government embark upon a broad and 
far-reaching search for discovery documentation was one way to cure 
the executive branch’s acknowledgment that “it ha[d] not utilized the 
procedure for compiling the CSRT record that the Department of 
Defense specified in its publicly-announced procedures for conducting 
CSRTs.”158 Bismullah invoked the rules of discovery to provide 
oversight where the executive branch inadequately managed its own 
review process. 
Boumediene takes the point about administrative incompetence even 
further by wresting oversight of enemy combatant determinations from 
the executive branch (through its CSRT process) and restoring a 
collateral review mechanism within Article III habeas courts. When the 
Supreme Court initially denied certiorari, Justice Stevens (joined by 
Justice Kennedy) wrote a statement supporting the decision to allow the 
administrative process of the DTA to run its course before providing 
collateral review.159 The Court reversed itself, however, after the parties 
submitted declarations attesting to the executive branch’s inadequate 
implementation of its own standards and procedures. Boumediene thus 
restored collateral review for a procedurally defective DTA process 
within the more trusted institution of federal habeas courts.160 
                                                     
156. See supra note 78. 
157. See supra note 81 and accompanying text; see also Decl. of Stephen Abraham, Lieutenant 
Colonel, U.S. Army Reserve, ¶¶ 5–24, Bismullah v. Gates, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. June 15, 2007) 
(No. 06-1197); Decl. of James M. McGarrah, Rear Admiral (Ret.), U.S. Navy, ¶¶ 4–6, 10–13, 
Bismullah, 501 F.3d 178 (D.C. Cir. May 31, 2007) (No. 06-1197). 
158. Bismullah, 501 F.3d at 193 (Rogers, J., concurring). 
159. The two Justices reasoned that, given the Court’s “practice of requiring the exhaustion of 
available remedies as a precondition to accepting jurisdiction over applications for the writ of 
habeas corpus,” the detainees would have to first exhaust their administrative remedy. Boumediene 
v. Bush, 549 U.S 1328, 1329 (2007) (mem.) (Stevens, J., concurring), vacated, 551 U.S. 1160 
(2007). 
160. To the extent that Guantánamo detainees had a choice between the DTA and habeas, post-
Boumediene decisions eliminated that option, and detainees now must proceed exclusively through 
habeas. See Bismullah v. Gates, 551 F.3d 1068, 1072–75 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also supra note 87 
and accompanying text. 
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Parhat also raises the issue of intra-branch deliberation, specifically 
the outward disagreement among various arms of the executive branch 
over the question of Parhat’s dangerousness and the need to hold him in 
detention. The court cited a 2003 recommendation by a military officer 
of the Department of Defense recommending Parhat’s release, as well as 
a statement made by the government during Parhat’s CSRT hearing that 
he “does represent an attractive candidate for release.”161 The court also 
observed that although the government had in its possession exculpatory 
evidence that contradicted a point upon which Parhat’s tribunal had 
relied, it never provided that evidence to the tribunal, undermining the 
court’s confidence that the tribunals had followed their own standards 
and procedures.162 Such inadequacies in bureaucratic competency made 
it necessary for the courts to exercise heightened judicial scrutiny of the 
executive branch’s adherence to its own standards and procedures. 
Hamdan illustrates a similar judicial concern with intra-branch 
deliberation and accountability. As Neil Katyal points out, one can read 
Hamdan as rejecting executive decision-making that did not conform to 
reasoned interpretation by seasoned veterans within the relevant arms of 
the executive branch. For example, the Court rejected the President’s 
interpretation that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions did not 
apply to the conflict with al-Qaida,163 a point of conflict between the 
President and longtime agency experts, including the Judge Advocates 
General and the Department of State.164 More generally, the President’s 
military commission system rejected in Hamdan lacked the support of 
the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, and top military 
officials.165 Hamdan did not explicitly raise the issue of deviations 
between the President’s position and the view held by veterans in the 
field, but its holding can be understood in part as a rejection of 
                                                     
161. Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 838 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
162. Id. at 845–46 (citation omitted). 
163. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 631–32 (2006). 
164. See Katyal, Legal Academy, supra note 142, at 105. 
165. See id. at 109–10 (“The Administration, when it designed the commissions, ignored 
Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and their staffs. It 
was also well known that the commission plan was pushed through over the disagreement of 
members of the military’s top brass. The informality of many of the determinations concerned the 
Hamdan majority. It dismissed the Administration’s arguments that press statements by cabinet 
members were valid ‘determinations’ entitling the President to deference . . . . [T]he Court wanted 
to see rigorous support, or any support, rather than incomplete conjecture.”). 
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“executive action taken without the prior involvement of experts.”166 
Under the circumstances, “[b]razenly advocating for a different 
executive branch process could potentially undermine the legitimacy of 
the Court . . . . Any second-guessing of the Executive could take place, if 
at all, only between the lines of a judicial opinion, for fear of treading on 
executive ground.”167 In this respect, Hamdan also suggests a judicial 
response to flawed internal workings of the Executive’s administrative 
bureaucracies.168 
3. Responding to Congressional Abdication 
Another function of muscular procedure is to provide a backstop 
where Congress neglects its duty to enact policy, or does so without 
reasoned deliberation. Here, too, the judiciary refuses to accede to a 
process marked by congressional abdication. After passing the AUMF 
and the USA PATRIOT Act shortly after the 9/11 attacks, Congress did 
relatively little for several years.169 As Katyal notes, “It did not affirm or 
regulate President Bush’s decision to use military commissions to try 
unlawful belligerents. It stood silent when President Bush accepted 
thinly reasoned legal views of the Geneva Conventions.”170 When 
                                                     
166. Id. at 109; see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s 
Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2340 (2006) [hereinafter Katyal, Internal 
Separation of Powers] (“The Bush Administration’s chief argument in federal court against, for 
example, the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to detainees at Guantánamo has been that 
OLC and the President have determined that the Conventions do not apply. Had a neutral 
adjudicator prepared a full ‘lower court’ opinion for final presidential decision, the case for judicial 
deference to the President would have been stronger.”). 
167. Katyal, Legal Academy, supra note 142, at 112. 
168. The government’s last-minute, mid-litigation policy changes further support the idea that 
poor bureaucratic decisions may have contributed to the government’s losses in court. The 
government created a review procedure for Guantánamo detainees the same day that it filed its 
Rasul merits briefs in the Supreme Court. See Katyal, Legal Academy, supra note 142, at 90. In the 
Padilla case, the government, after years of denying Padilla an attorney, allowed him to meet with a 
lawyer just before its Supreme Court briefs were due. Id. The government also changed the rules on 
military commission strategies after the certiorari petition was filed in Hamdan. Id. These about-
face maneuverings may have deepened the judiciary’s lack of confidence in the executive branch’s 
deliberative process, even where its actions were technically authorized by Congress. 
169. Congress passed the AUMF one week after 9/11, Pub. L. No. 107-40, §§ 1–2, 115 Stat. 224 
(Sept. 18, 2001), and the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001), 
within two months of 9/11. 
170. Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers, supra note 166, at 2319; id. at 2316 (“Publius’s view 
of separation of powers presumes three branches with equivalent ambitions of maximizing their 
powers, yet [after 9/11] legislative abdication is the reigning modus operandi. It is often remarked 
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Congress did get around to passing the DTA after Rasul and the MCA 
after Hamdan,171 it proceeded through a “quick and inevitably messy 
quilting bee” that left unresolved a mounting series of issues surrounding 
the confinement of Guantánamo detainees.172 Where Congress left a gap, 
Rasul and Hamdan required a clear legislative statement to ensure that 
executive detention policies would be based on more than unilateral 
interpretations of statutory and constitutional law. 
The compromised state of the MCA was further evident within 
statements by individual members of Congress who, even while voting 
in favor of the statute, openly declared their belief in its 
unconstitutionality.173 In response, Boumediene struck down portions of 
the legislation that “Congress . . . wanted to see judicially invalidated, or 
at least substantially altered, by the courts.”174 According to District 
                                                     
that ‘9/11 changed everything’; particularly so in the war on terror, in which Congress has been 
absent or content to pass vague, open-ended statutes. The result is an executive that subsumes much 
of the tripartite structure of government.”); see also Jinks & Katyal, supra note 152, at 1277 (noting 
“the abdication of Congress for the five years after the September 11, 2001, attacks in many of the 
key decisions [involving national security]”); James Robertson, Quo Vadis, Habeas Corpus?, 55 
BUFF. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2008) ([“[A]fter Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,] Congress not only authorized the 
Executive to conduct trials by military commission at Guantánamo Bay, but, en passant, it also 
stripped the federal courts of their statutory jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions or any other 
actions filed by aliens who are detained as enemy combatants or who are even awaiting a 
determination of whether or not they are enemy combatants. So much for what I had thought was 
the fecklessness of the legislature!”); infra note 172 and accompanying text. 
171. Section 7 of the MCA replaced the DTA’s jurisdiction-stripping provision with clearer 
language stripping statutory habeas jurisdiction for all habeas claims, including cases that were 
pending at the time of its enactment. See Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(b), 120 Stat. 2600, 2636 (2006) 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 note (2006)) (applying the jurisdictional bar in “all cases, without 
exception, pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act which relate to any aspect of the 
detention . . . of an alien detained by the United States since September 11, 2001”); see also 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2243 (2008) (“[W]e cannot ignore that the 
MCA was a direct response to Hamdan’s holding that the DTA’s jurisdiction-stripping provision 
had no application to pending cases.”). The MCA left intact the limited review mechanism under the 
DTA for federal review in the D.C. Circuit. 
172. See Katyal, Legal Academy, supra note 142, at 106; see also id. at 104 n.158 (noting that 
“the MCA was rushed through Congress with no deliberation”); id. at 115 (“Instead of engaging in a 
sober debate about the meaning of constitutional text, history, and precedent, Congress rushed the 
MCA through without much thought to the constitutional consequences.”). But cf. Boumediene, 128 
S. Ct. at 2279 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The political branches crafted these procedures amidst an 
ongoing military conflict, after much careful investigation and thorough debate.”). 
173. See, e.g., Charles Babington & Jonathan Weisman, Senate Approves Detainee Bill Backed 
by Bush, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2006, at A13 (reporting that Sen. Specter voted for the MCA after 
telling reporters the bill was “patently unconstitutional”). 
174. Paul A. Diller, When Congress Passes an Intentionally Unconstitutional Law: The Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, 61 SMU L. REV. 281, 282 (2008). 
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Judge James Robertson, who oversaw the Hamdan litigation in district 
court, “it may be that Congress was stampeded into thinking that 
unscrupulous lawyers and activist judges would just gum things up at 
Guantánamo. If that is what Congress thought, it had faulty 
intelligence.”175 Given the lack of serious consideration by Congress or 
the Executive, the judiciary, “the only other structural actor with a long-
term perspective” on the democratic process,176 provided a vital stopgap 
measure requiring the political branches to engage in a more thorough, 
deliberative process.177 
III.  PUTTING MUSCULAR PROCEDURE IN CONTEXT 
A. Muscular Procedure and Civil Libertarianism 
Because so much of the post-9/11 literature focuses on the ways that 
judicial decisions have been insufficiently substantive, it tends to 
overlook how procedural decisions have been muscular. While civil 
libertarians claim that procedural decisions conceal a surreptitious 
advancement of a substantive agenda through opportunistic commitment 
to procedural principles,178 the force of this observation, which has 
                                                     
175. See Robertson, supra note 170, at 1084–85. 
176. Katyal, Legal Academy, supra note 142, at 105; see also Jinks & Katyal, supra note 152, at 
1264. 
177. For an exceptionally vibrant depiction of the general type of problem described above, see 
Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term—Foreword: Antidiscrimination and 
Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80, 
103–04 (1991): 
Legislatures often act hastily or thoughtlessly with respect to fundamental rights because of 
panic or crises or because, more often, they are simply pressed for time. At other times, they 
hide infringements of rights through vague language or give no thought to the reach of the 
language they have used. At still other times, they delegate to bureaucrats who are not 
accountable to the people and who therefore cannot be trusted with the protection of rights. 
Legislatures also often shirk responsibility by failing to repeal old laws that have come—either 
through growth in rights or through change in the effect of the old laws—to violate 
entitlements that would be deemed fundamental if the issue were truly addressed today. All the 
above cases are instances of a breakdown of accountability that affects fundamental rights, and 
thus could be called failures of “constitutional accountability.” The two most general 
categories of such breakdown are “haste or thoughtlessness” and “hiding.”  
The Bickellian approach to judicial review is based on the notion that, even if majoritarian 
legislatures are generally more trustworthy and less dangerous than courts as the definers and 
bulwarks of fundamental rights, when there is haste or hiding we cannot rely only on 
legislators to protect such rights. When there is hiding, neither the people nor their 
representatives are genuinely speaking; when there is haste, they may be speaking, but without 
the attention required for the protection of rights. 
178. Civil libertarians also have critiqued legal process approaches as lacking any real theoretical 
explanation for why procedure should be valued in its own right. As Larry Tribe has noted, purely 
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relevance in many contexts, may have less traction in national security. 
Martinez appeals to that idea by arguing that “[t]he danger of Legal 
Process . . . is that its seeming neutrality often obscures value judgments 
about the underlying substantive policies.”179 Accordingly, “[t]o the 
extent that seemingly fair procedures distract people from unfair 
substantive outcomes, these uses of procedure may be 
dangerous . . . . [T]he legitimizing role that procedure plays in 
perceptions of justice may be part of the problem, not the solution.”180 
But while modern interpretations of standing doctrine,181 statutes of 
limitations,182 pleading standards,183 immunity doctrines,184 and privilege 
                                                     
process-based theories of law must be based within a theory of the intrinsic worthiness of process 
itself; if not, a true theoretical commitment to process breaks down. See Laurence H. Tribe, The 
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1070–71 
(1980). 
179. Martinez, supra note 1, at 1025. Martinez notes that even though “we may choose to vest 
certain decisions in Congress because we believe that body’s deliberative nature is likely to lead to 
better policy choices,” id. at 1061, procedural decisions “cannot provide a total escape from hard 
substantive choices; when the main benefit of procedure is that it hides those substantive choices, 
we ought to be concerned,” id. at 1092. 
180. Id. at 1087. 
181. Specifically, the Supreme Court elevated the requirements of causation and redressability, 
two criteria generally considered part of a court’s merits inquiry, into two of the three elements 
necessary to establish standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially 
Imposed Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1200 (1993) (arguing that Lujan will 
result in fewer lawsuits, permitting agencies to ignore legislative commands). Justice Brennan 
echoed the civil libertarian concern when he referred to certain procedural doctrines as “no more 
than a poor disguise for the Court’s view of the merits of the underlying claims.” Allen v. Wright, 
468 U.S. 737, 782 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 
1981 Term—Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 23 
(1982) (“This ritual recitation [of the components of standing doctrine] having been performed, the 
Court then chooses up sides and decides the case.”); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Causation as a Standing 
Requirement: The Unprincipled Use of Judicial Restraint, 69 KY. L.J. 185, 185 (1980–1981) (“One 
of the most controversial methods employed by the Burger Court to temper the expansion of 
standing under the broad injury-in-fact test has been the development of an autonomous doctrine of 
causation.”); Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government Of, By, and For the People: 
Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 72 (2008) (“[T]he causation 
doctrine . . . embroils the threshold standing determination too heavily in the merits and works to 
undermine the Court’s role in protecting individuals from harm resulting from illegal government 
activity.”) (quoting Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 
CORNELL L. REV. 663, 664 (1977)). 
182. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 641 (2007) (denying 
remedy to plaintiff challenging unlawful sex discrimination on grounds that her initial complaint 
was filed after the expiration of the 180-day statutory maximum after her first instance of 
discrimination); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007). 
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law185 have at times placed procedure in the way of efforts to vigorously 
enforce statutes requiring the executive branch to fulfill its 
responsibilities,186 the post-9/11 context has unfolded quite differently. 
While civil libertarians correctly note that deferring on substantive 
decisions can prolong injustice, not least the mistreatment of detainees 
during their extended periods of unlawful confinement,187 procedural 
rulings in this context have generally not been a mechanism for 
“hid[ing] . . . substantive choices.”188 Rather, courts have been clear 
about the underlying normative basis for asserting values of 
transparency and deliberation, “mak[ing] explicit their substance-
oriented justifications for procedural steps”189 and usefully calling the 
political branches to account for failing to make apparent their own 
substantive commitments or faithfully following through on their own 
procedural commitments. The result has been a dialogue in the service of 
prompting substantive reform where the political branches already 
appear to have agreed on an untenable course of action. 
                                                     
183. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007). Twombly retired the interpretation of FED. R. CIV. P. 8 
articulated within Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957), according to which motions to 
dismiss would not be granted “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts . . . which would entitle him to relief,” Twombly, 570 U.S. at 561, appearing to replace that 
rule with a “plausibility standard” that would require plaintiffs to “nudge[] their claims across the 
line from conceivable to plausible” to survive a motion to dismiss, id. at 570. 
184. This includes sovereign immunity, as expanded under recent Eleventh Amendment 
jurisprudence, as well as qualified immunity doctrines. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 181, at 97–
104. 
185. See id. at 92 (“Government privileges have expanded—particularly the state secrets and 
executive privilege doctrines—unnecessarily keeping information about the people’s government 
from themselves. The interest in accurate judicial fact-finding and our ability to scrutinize the 
government’s decision-making process are important reasons to limit this growth of secrecy.”). 
186. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and 
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 194 (1992); see also Andrew M. Siegel, Notes Towards an 
Alternate Vision of the Judicial Role, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 511–13 (2009). 
187. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
188. Martinez, supra note 1, at 1092. 
189. See Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 
84 YALE L.J. 718, 736 (1975). Robert Cover emphasized the flexibility of procedural rules, noting 
that procedural mechanisms could be used as a device to resolve cases where the substantive law 
offers no solution for a just outcome. But he abhorred the deployment of procedure, for however a 
noble purpose, that was unhinged from a larger substantive purpose, for such decisions failed to 
reduce uncertainty, treated litigants unequally, and failed to advance a rule of procedure that could 
apply to all cases. See id. at 726–28. 
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In this regard, Stephen Vladeck observes that recent decisions are 
“characterized by narrow holdings and implicit guidance to the political 
branches on how to avoid more serious confrontations.”190 Within those 
decisions, “a conversation between the [Supreme] Court and the political 
branches [takes place] in several acts.”191 Anthony Colangelo argues, 
similarly, that “the Court . . . has sought not to create clear, categorical 
substantive rules,” but has instead “adopted methodologies by which the 
national security/individual rights balance can be carefully weighed 
based on the particular circumstances of a particular case[,]” what he 
calls “legal conversation-starters.”192 The decisions integrate procedural 
requirements into legal contexts where, doctrinally, courts generally 
recognize coordinate branch expertise on substantive policy questions.193 
Still, the judiciary puts procedural tools to muscular effect, reinforcing 
its concern about deeper rule-of-law considerations by ruling on matters 
about which it has a comparative advantage in expertise. 
In cases where courts have rejected a muscular procedural approach—
as, for instance, where they ground their decisions in a standard of pure 
deference—they have done damage to the causes that civil libertarians 
champion. In these cases of pure deference, courts have blocked efforts 
to enforce executive branch obligations under domestic and treaty law, 
including commitments to protect detainees from torture overseas. For 
example, in Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II),194 the D.C. Circuit handed 
detainees a very unfavorable ruling on the issue of repatriations to 
countries where they fear torture.195 Kiyemba II invalidated more than 
one hundred transfer-abeyance motions, which district courts granted 
both before and after Boumediene, requiring the government to provide 
counsel for a detainee thirty days’ notice prior to effecting a transfer 
from Guantánamo.196 On the question of federal jurisdiction, the court 
                                                     
190. Stephen I. Vladeck, The Long War, the Federal Courts, and the Necessity/Legality Paradox, 
43 U. Rich. L. Rev. 893, 897 (2009).  
191. Id. at 910. 
192. Anthony J. Colangelo, Brief Remarks on the Supreme Court’s Role After 9/11: Continuing 
the Legal Conversation in the War on Terror, 62 SMU L. REV. 17, 18 (2009) (emphases omitted); 
see also id. at 21–22 (“[B]y guarding the constitutional dimensions of the war on terror from 
political conversation-stoppers, the Court actually facilitates ongoing public deliberation over the 
national security/individual rights balance.”). 
193. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
194. 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
195. Id. at 516. 
196. The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases, Jurisdiction Over Americans Held 
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resolved an issue, apparently left open by Boumediene, whether 
detainees could invoke habeas as a vehicle for challenging matters 
collateral to detention, such as conditions of confinement, transfer and 
release.197 But on the broader question of detainee transfers, Kiyemba II 
ruled flatly that courts cannot second-guess executive branch expertise 
on the human rights practices of foreign countries, regardless of the 
detainees’ claims that they would be harmed upon return. In the words 
of the D.C. Circuit, district courts simply “may not question the 
Government’s determination that a potential recipient country is not 
likely to torture a detainee . . . [and] a detainee cannot prevail on the 
merits of a claim seeking to bar his transfer based upon the likelihood of 
his being tortured in the recipient country.”198 The court’s reliance on 
                                                     
Overseas, 122 HARV. L. REV. 415, 421 (2008). Prior to Kiyemba II, the thirty-day notice motions 
were generally granted. See Robert M. Chesney, Leaving Guantánamo: The Law of International 
Detainee Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 657, 667 (2006) (“[B]y the end of June 2005, judges had 
decided thirty-four of the GTMO transfer motions, with twenty-seven pro-detainee decisions 
imposing the requested notice requirement and six pro-government decisions denying that relief 
(one split decision granted relief to one petitioner but denied it to two others).”); see also Ameziane 
v. Bush, No. 05-0392, 2005 WL 839542 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2005) (requiring notice pursuant to All 
Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)); Al-Joudi v. Bush, No. 05-301, 2005 WL 774847 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 
2005) (order granting request for preliminary injunction); Abdah v. Bush, No. 04- 1254, 2005 WL 
711814 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2005) (same). But see Al-Anazi v. Bush, 370 F. Supp. 2d 188, 189 
(D.D.C. 2005) (denying preliminary injunction for thirty-day notice order); Almurbati v. Bush, 366 
F. Supp. 2d 72, 73 (D.D.C. 2005) (same). 
197. See Kiyemba II, 561 F.3d at 512–13. Section 7 of the MCA amended the federal habeas 
statute to preclude not only habeas corpus petitions by Guantánamo detainees, MCA § 7(a), 28 
U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1) (2006), but also “any other action against the United States . . . relating to any 
aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement” of a detained alien 
determined to be an enemy combatant. MCA § 7(b), 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2). Boumediene did not 
clearly invalidate all of section 7 of the MCA, leaving open the argument that the Court struck down 
only section 7(a). See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2274 (2008) (“MCA § 7 
thus effects an unconstitutional suspension of the writ. In view of our holding we need not discuss 
the reach of the writ with respect to claims of unlawful conditions of treatment or confinement.”) 
(emphasis added). District courts within the District of Columbia held, prior to Kiyemba II, that 
Boumediene’s failure to invalidate MCA section 7(b) meant that detainees could not challenge the 
conditions of their confinement at Guantánamo. See, e.g., Al-Adahi v. Obama, 596 F.Supp.2d 111, 
117–19 (D.D.C. 2009); Khadr v. Bush, 587 F. Supp. 2d 225, 236 (D.D.C. 2008); In re Guantánamo 
Bay Detainee Litig., 577 F. Supp. 2d 312, 313 (D.D.C. 2008); In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee 
Litig., 570 F. Supp. 2d 13, 17–19 (D.D.C. 2008). However, after Kiyemba II, it is clear that the 
MCA does not pose an obstacle to a conditions-of-confinement claim: detainees can challenge 
abusive treatment or lack of medical care through the vehicle of habeas. How, exactly, the expanded 
habeas jurisdiction of Kiyemba II can be squared with the declaration in Kiyemba I that Guantánamo 
detainees lack all due process rights, see infra notes 236–37 and accompanying text, remains to be 
seen. 
198. Kiyemba II, 561 F.3d at 514. 
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broad standards of deference to the Executive in matters of foreign 
affairs prevented the possibility of any judicial oversight, even where 
detainees challenged the underlying quality of the Executive’s process 
for ensuring the safe treatment of repatriated detainees. Unless the 
Supreme Court intervenes, Kiyemba II prevents detainees from using 
litigation to halt transfers where, owing to conditions overseas, the best 
practice is to remain at Guantánamo.199 
                                                     
199. The rationale of Kiyemba II is based largely upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Munaf v. 
Geren, 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008), decided the same day as Boumediene. In Munaf, two 
U.S. citizens who committed crimes in Iraq after 9/11 brought habeas corpus petitions challenging 
their transfer from U.S. to Iraqi custody for prosecution before an Iraqi court. 128 S. Ct. at 2214–16. 
(One of the two petitioners, Muhammed Munaf, was tried and sentenced to death by an Iraqi court 
for helping organize a kidnapping, but his conviction was overturned by the Iraqi Court of Cassation 
in February 2009. Id. at 2215.) A unanimous Supreme Court held that U.S. citizens located off U.S. 
shores could invoke the writ but denied the petition on the merits. Id. at 2213. Although one of the 
petitioners claimed that his transfer “to Iraqi custody [was] likely to result in torture,” the Court held 
that this “matter of serious concern” needed to “be addressed by the political branches, not the 
judiciary.” Id. at 2225. However, the Court noted distinct procedural safeguards inspiring greater 
confidence in the overseas tribunal. Unlike Kiyemba II, Munaf was situated within a criminal-law 
context in which the Court was satisfied with the procedural safeguards of the foreign tribunal. 
Habeas relief “would interfere with Iraq’s sovereign right to ‘punish offenses against its laws 
committed within its borders,’” Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2220 (quoting Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 
529 (1957)), and the Court cautioned against the invocation of the writ as “a means of compelling 
the United States to harbor fugitives from the criminal justice system of a sovereign with undoubted 
authority to prosecute them,” id. at 2223. Moreover, the petitioners were held by U.S. forces, “an 
integral part of the Iraqi system of criminal justice,” as they awaited trial by the Iraqi criminal 
courts. Id. at 2214–15, 2223–24. Justice Souter’s concurrence also noted that the petitioners 
voluntarily traveled to Iraq, a U.S. ally, which was prosecuting them for crimes committed on its 
soil; the prison and detention facilities in which the men would be held were determined by the U.S. 
State Department to have generally met internationally accepted standards for basic prisoner needs; 
and, on the specific topic of torture, the case left open the possibility of a different outcome “in 
which the probability of torture is well documented, even if the Executive fails to acknowledge it.” 
Id. at 2228 (Souter, J., concurring). Kiyemba II, by contrast, did not present the same safeguards 
noted by the Court in Munaf: the petitioners were not accused of wrongdoing and were deemed by 
the U.S. government to be at risk of torture upon return to their home country. See Kiyemba II, 561 
F.3d at 519 n.5 (“[T]he United States will not send these Uighur detainees back to their home 
country of China, apparently because the Executive has concluded there is a likelihood of torture by 
China.”). Unlike Kiyemba II, Munaf is an illustration of muscular procedure that affirms an 
executive branch determination, as opposed to the many cases discussed previously that reject an 
executive determination through muscular procedural review. See also infra note 238 (discussing 
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), as a decision employing muscular procedure to affirm 
an executive branch decision). 
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B. Muscular Procedure and Bilateral Endorsement 
The unique post-9/11 context also raises questions about the 
descriptive accuracy and normative attractiveness of a pure, unalloyed 
bilateral endorsement approach. Boumediene “declared unconstitutional 
a law enacted by Congress and signed by the president on an issue of 
military policy in a time of armed conflict,”200 which would have passed 
muster under the bilateral endorsement approach. Moreover, Hamdi 
placed restrictions on the detention of enemy combatants even though 
Congress appeared to authorize those detentions through passage of the 
AUMF.201 Hamdi and Boumediene, while leaving open questions about 
the scope of executive authority under the AUMF, contradict the 
premise that legislative endorsement is always a sufficient basis for 
legitimating executive action. 
Moreover, the political reality after 9/11 raises questions about the 
normative attractiveness of bilateral endorsement, particularly the 
reliance its adherents have placed on a “dynamic political process 
between legislature and executive”202 during times when liberty and 
security come into conflict. That dynamism has been generally 
nonexistent during the past several years,203 during which time Congress 
has defined itself more by abdication than by oversight of executive 
action.204 
In any event, mere agreement between two branches in no way 
assures a commitment to the rule of law. As scholars have noted, 
                                                     
200. Cole, supra note 1, at 48. 
201. See supra notes 149–52 and accompanying text. 
202. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 2, at 11; see also Posner & Sunstein, supra note 58, at 
1199–2000 (“[I]f the national legislature distrusts the President, it has every reason to legislate 
clearly, so as to reduce his room to maneuver. A future Congress, for example, might issue a more 
detailed AUMF, one that more carefully described the entities against which force could be used 
and the limits under which the President might operate, rather than leaving those issues to a 
President it did not trust or to courts that had no expertise in the area. In this respect, our approach 
might well revitalize Congress’s own role, precisely by encouraging greater specificity.”). For a 
critique of the Posner and Sunstein position that reorients the discussion around the question of a 
sufficient deliberative process within the executive branch, see Jinks & Katyal, supra note 152, at 
1247–48. 
203. See supra Part II.B.3. 
204. As Benjamin Wittes observes, “The absence of the national legislature from some of the 
most significant policy discussions of our time has brought about deleterious consequences at a 
number of levels.” BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE 
AGE OF TERROR 10 (2008). 
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bilateral endorsement “runs the risk of inviting Congress and the 
executive to collude in the violation of individual rights.”205 It also may 
overlook built-in constraints to the law-making process206 as well as the 
incentives for members of Congress to avoid any rigorous oversight role 
of the executive branch.207 Muscular procedure has provided a critical 
check by conditioning judicial deference on an integrity within 
coordinate branch decision-making that bilateral endorsement takes on 
faith. 
Decisions of muscular procedure can also help to stimulate the 
dynamic process upon which the bilateral endorsement model is based. 
Where the President asserts conclusions based on an incomplete 
record208 or evidence lacking minimal indicia of reliability,209 the 
judiciary raises a procedural obligation requiring greater transparency or 
deliberation. Similarly, where the government asserts a sphere of control 
at the outer reaches of vague authorizing legislation,210 inadequately 
fulfills a mandate under a congressional delegation,211 or leaves a 
legislative void,212 muscular procedure reorients coordinate branch 
decision-making toward the judiciary’s own standard of procedural 
regularity. Hamdi, Boumediene, and Bismullah suggest perhaps a first-
cut preference for bilateral endorsement, followed by a critical 
procedural stopgap when the coordinate branches fail to engage in an 
adequately considered and deliberative decision-making process. Courts 
continue to “defer[] to decisions of political branches on how to resolve 
                                                     
205. Cleveland, supra note 60, at 1135. Cleveland states that “[i]f both Congress and the 
President explicitly embrace a wartime policy that infringes on civil liberties, other than ensuring 
that basic procedural requirements are respected, there appears little under Jackson’s approach that 
courts would do to stop them.” Id.; see also Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers, supra note 166, 
at 2348 (“[B]ecause many foreign-policy decisions are made in secret, political accountability will 
not be as much of a constraint as in the domestic context.”); cf. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 2, 
at 19 (“The risk of an entire nation, and its elected representatives, succumbing to wartime hysteria 
is ever present.”). 
206. See, e.g., Jinks & Katyal, supra note 152, at 1255. 
207. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena I. Steinzor, The People’s Agent: Executive Branch 
Secrecy and Accountability in an Age of Terrorism, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 112 (Summer 
2006) (noting various agency costs of overseeing the Executive). 
208. See supra Part II.A.1. 
209. See supra Part II.A.2; supra notes 138–48 and accompanying text. 
210. See supra Part II.B.1. 
211. See supra Part II.B.2. 
212. See supra Part II.B.3. 
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constitutional issues, so long as those decisions bear the earmarks of 
deliberation and care.”213 
IV.  MUSCULAR PROCEDURE’S DOCTRINAL IMPACT 
Muscular procedure is not a cure-all for the vast, intractable problems 
that arise within the national security context. However, it is an effective 
midway point between deferring wholesale to the coordinate branches 
on the one hand and dictating substantive outcomes on the other. It 
combines the idea of deference to the coordinate branches with an 
examination of the procedures those branches adopt in implementing 
policy—spanning both the legislative process and the Executive’s 
implementation of delegated authority. These procedural demands are 
generally consistent with the deference courts must accord the political 
branches, while still requiring them to employ a modicum of 
transparency or deliberation when implementing a given policy. By 
requiring adherence to these procedural standards in contexts where one 
might find pure deference, the judiciary articulates a basis for more 
muscular judicial review and a normative reinforcement for its 
involvement in areas generally committed to the plenary power of one or 
both of the political branches.214 
A. Muscular Procedure’s Normative Basis 
Endorsing muscular procedure need not require the conclusion that 
courts are always ill-equipped to decide substantive questions such as 
the content of constitutional liberty or the scope of executive power in 
times of crisis. However, there are distinct benefits to resolving national 
security cases, when possible, through decisions of procedural law. 
Procedural decisions allow courts to resolve cases, even in the highly 
contested area of national security, while still claiming to confine 
themselves to an area of judicial expertise and legitimacy. 
As an initial matter, procedure is generally seen as the province of the 
judiciary and an area in which it has a comparative advantage in 
                                                     
213. Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collaboration: Protecting Fundamental Values with 
Second-Look Rules of Interbranch Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1583 (2001). 
214. For general background on the plenary power doctrine, see Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers 
Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary 
Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
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expertise.215 As undeniable experts on process, courts can more sensibly 
claim to be better qualified and situated to make procedural decisions 
than political officials.216 The judiciary is both uniquely charged with 
resolving procedural disputes and responsible for doing so. Certainly, its 
failure to resolve pressing procedural questions poses unique harms for 
the rule of law.217 Procedural decisions are especially valuable in the 
national security context because they can resolve complex cases 
without dragging the courts into partisan debates over contested issues of 
great social consequence, which can be far more contentious, take much 
longer to resolve, and expose the judiciary to claims that it is improperly 
taking sides in political matters. 
Procedural decisions have instrumental value as well. They avoid the 
risk of placing a judicial imprimatur on more heavily freighted, and 
fractious, questions of policy. The strong norms of judicial deference 
that apply within the national security context can cause confusion; a 
court’s decision to uphold executive action on substantive grounds could 
be taken as signaling deep normative endorsement, even when a decision 
merely applies standard doctrinal deference norms. Procedural decisions 
can avoid these types of unintentional legitimizing effects, instead 
placing “conditions on the effectual exercise of legislative”218 and 
executive power without dictating the positive terms of any particular 
legislative initiative. The decisions focus on the means of coordinate 
branch decision-making, allowing the political branches to design the 
ends, provided they do so with a transparency expected by any 
legitimately constituted body, whether political or judicial. 
Muscular procedural decisions, while not strictly constitutional in 
nature, “draw[] their inspiration and authority from . . . various 
constitutional provisions”219 and find their justification in a form of legal 
process that has developed over the course of the past half-century. More 
                                                     
215. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10–12, at 711 (2d ed. 
1988) (noting Supreme Court decisions that “rest[] on a notion of the special relevance of judicial 
expertise, and the comparative irrelevance of legislative competence, in making process-oriented 
decisions”). 
216. For the classic articulation of this view, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: 
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 102–04 (1980). 
217. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 225 (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
(noting the “lasting stains on a system of justice” wrought by procedural defects). 
218. Hart & Sacks, supra note 18, at 1376. 
219. Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 
(1975). 
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than fifty years ago, Alexander Bickel and Harry Wellington identified 
aspects of that process when they observed: 
Congress cannot normally be expected also to be aware that 
some of the means chosen to achieve immediate ends impinge in 
not easily apparent fashion on values of permanent significance. 
Were this not so the Constitution, which embodies such values 
(and not least among them principles of the recognition of 
institutional capabilities), could be left to the care of Congress 
alone. But the Supreme Court also guards it and draws from it 
what is enduring. We contend that, by the same token, other 
values not enshrined in the Constitution but existing in its 
penumbra and akin to constitutional ones (and like them not to 
be judged in terms of the choice of temporal policies that is for 
Congress alone to make) are also entrusted to the guardianship 
of the Court. They are no doubt somewhat lower on the scale of 
timeless importance and the Court therefore does not have the 
power to decree without recourse that they must be vindicated at 
all costs or even to define their content with finality. But it is for 
the Court to bring them to the fore so that they may receive their 
due weight in Congress as they are otherwise most unlikely to 
do.220 
By emphasizing the importance of transparency and deliberation 
within coordinate branch decision-making, muscular procedure 
reinforces a judicial process that “serve[s] to implement constitutional 
demands” without undermining “a role for the political branches in 
specifying the shape that these requirements take.”221 This procedural 
review avoids “closing off any policy options for either the executive 
branch or the legislature in the short term.”222 Yet it has prohibited either 
branch from shrouding decision-making within unnecessary and 
inappropriate levels of opacity in ways that would detract from a more 
enduring judicial commitment to clear and intelligible process. 
                                                     
220. Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: 
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (1957). 
221. Metzger, supra note 129, at 71. 
222. Wittes, supra note 204, at 104. 
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B. Identifying Muscular Procedure Beyond National Security—The 
Immigration Context 
The marshalling of procedure by courts as a response to inadequate 
deliberation by a co-equal branch has relevance not only within national 
security cases, but in the plenary power context more generally. 
Procedural law already has a special function in immigration-related 
cases. For example, Hiroshi Motomura has pointed out multiple 
decisions in the immigration context in which courts use procedure as a 
surrogate for resolving substantive constitutional problems—
specifically, problems of equal protection—that the plenary power 
doctrine expressly precludes.223 Although courts generally are unable to 
strike down immigration laws entirely on constitutional grounds, they 
can use procedural surrogates to channel their commitment to a 
constitutional value “by first construing the constitutional challenge as 
‘procedural,’ and then invalidating the decision on procedural due 
process grounds.”224 This allows courts to use due process to remedy the 
differential treatment of various groups within immigration law, in effect 
translating equal protection values through the Due Process Clause’s 
liberty component.225 “Because of the anomalous structure that the 
plenary power doctrine imposes on constitutional immigration law,” 
Motomura explains, “procedural decisions are often the only vehicle for 
taking substantive constitutional rights seriously . . . .”226 These 
procedural surrogates for constitutional decision-making thus provide a 
                                                     
223. Motomura, supra note 5, at 1659 (arguing that procedural decisions have become a 
“surrogate[] for the substantive constitutional claims that the plenary power doctrine would seem to 
bar”); id. at 1627–28 (noting how courts “created an important exception to the plenary power 
doctrine by hearing constitutional claims sounding in ‘procedural due process’”). The judicially 
created plenary power doctrine requires courts to defer to legislative and executive decision-making 
in immigration-related matters. The doctrine emerged from a sense “that immigration law and 
policy touched on the most vital and sensitive concerns of national sovereignty, self-definition, and 
self-preservation.” Id. at 1648. Examples are legion. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 
(1977) (underscoring “the limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation”); 
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 755–60, 769–70 (1972) (holding that the Attorney General’s 
decision to deny a temporary nonimmigrant visa to a Belgian journalist espousing Marxist views 
could not be challenged under the First Amendment); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 
345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (“[I]t is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized 
by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the Government.”). 
224. Motomura, supra note 5, at 1628. 
225. See id. at 1656–79. 
226. Id. at 1631. 
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crucial response to the harsh effects of the plenary power doctrine; they 
are, nevertheless, an incomplete response, for as Stephen Legomsky 
explains, “it is an exception that the Supreme Court has displayed little 
consistency in recognizing.”227 
While procedural due process in immigration is often used as a 
mechanism for keeping pace with evolving equal protection norms, 
muscular procedural rules in immigration decisions place checks on 
executive unilateralism by preventing the potential abuse of discretion in 
the exercise of the Executive’s removal power and detention authority. 
The judicial concern in immigration cases, as in the Guantánamo 
context, is the adherence by a co-equal branch to a standard of 
transparency and deliberation set by the court. 
Decisions such as INS v. St. Cyr228 and Zadvydas v. Davis229 apply 
clear statement principles and constitutional avoidance canons, 
respectively, to place a check upon the Executive’s potential (or actual) 
mishandling of detention and removal policy. Rather than signal a 
commitment to equal protection, the cases reject executive branch 
interpretations of statutes that would consolidate power exclusively 
within one branch. 
St. Cyr applied the clear statement requirement to retain statutory 
habeas jurisdiction under the general federal habeas provision, even 
though explicit language in the Immigration and Nationality Act 
appeared to strip habeas review for certain types of immigration cases 
uniformly throughout all federal law.230 The Court’s jurisdictional 
holding rejected an interpretation that would have denied a broad class 
of immigration petitioners any review mechanism—an interpretation the 
Court refused to credit without a crystal clear statement of congressional 
                                                     
227. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 
1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 298. 
228. 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
229. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
230. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298–314 (holding that various provisions of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996—both of which contained comprehensive amendments to the 
Immigration and Nationality Act—did not strip federal courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 2241). Upon finding habeas jurisdiction, the Court held that a form of relief from removal 
that existed prior to the 1996 immigration reforms remained available to individuals who, like St. 
Cyr, were eligible for such relief at the time they pled guilty to certain crimes but were placed in 
removal proceedings after that form of relief was repealed. Id. at 326. 
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intent,231 even in matters of immigration, where judicial deference runs 
high. Removing one branch (the judicial branch) entirely from having 
any input into the availability of relief from crime-related removal orders 
raised the possibility that no other body would step in to cure mistakes—
including procedural error—in the agency’s implementation of 
deportation policy.232 
Zadvydas invoked procedural concerns as well to reject the executive 
branch’s position that it enjoyed unlimited detention authority over 
removable aliens. The Court limited the executive detention power to “a 
period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the 
United States,”233 which it held to be six months “in light of the 
Constitution’s demands.”234 The Court avoided any express 
interpretation of the Constitution, pointing out instead that the 
presumptive six-month limit was predicated on the notion that “[t]he 
Constitution may well preclude granting an administrative body 
unreviewable authority to make determinations implicating fundamental 
rights.”235 
While procedural surrogates in immigration filter a judicial 
commitment to equal protection through a procedural lens, muscular 
procedure conveys a concern about political branch abdication and the 
broader balance of power among the three branches. As in the 
Guantánamo context, judicial review increases when the coordinate 
branches create a vacuum of insufficient adherence to baseline 
procedural standards, which muscular procedure abhors. The more that 
executive action deviates from a rational implementation of a delegation 
or detracts from a plausible interpretation of even a vague congressional 
statute, the more the judiciary responds with muscular procedural 
review. 
                                                     
231. Id. at 312–13 (finding an absence of any provision that “speaks with sufficient clarity to bar 
jurisdiction pursuant to the general habeas statute”). 
232. See, e.g., id. at 305 (“[A] serious Suspension Clause issue would be presented if we were to 
accept the INS’ submission that the 1996 statutes have withdrawn that power from federal judges 
and provided no adequate substitute for its exercise . . . .”). 
233. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. at 692 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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C. Muscular Procedure’s Effect in Future Cases 
Whether the judiciary continues to issue decisions of muscular 
procedure will likely depend upon the deliberation the coordinate 
branches bring to future security-related decisions. The testing ground 
may emerge in a case the Supreme Court will consider in its current 
Term involving the repatriation of detainees whom the government has 
determined pose no threat to the United States, or possibly in another 
case in which detainees are seeking to block their return to countries 
where they fear torture. On the former question, the D.C. Circuit ruled in 
Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba I)236 that detainees still stationed at 
Guantánamo, including those ordered released by habeas courts, have no 
due process rights and that, accordingly, district courts may not order 
their release into the United States.237 Kiyemba I places into doubt 
federal court authority to review the prolonged detention of individuals 
who have been cleared for release but cannot be relocated safely to a 
third country. The case provides occasion for the Supreme Court to 
clarify aspects of Rasul and Boumediene that appear to repudiate 
decisions upon which the Kiyemba I court relied—in particular, cases 
barring non-citizens from redressing action by U.S. officials outside the 
territorial United States.238 More deeply, the case raises questions about 
                                                     
236. 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3577 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2009) (No. 
08-1234). 
237. Id. at 1026. 
238. Kiyemba I relied heavily on pre-Boumediene decisions drawing a sharp distinction between 
the protections available to aliens located inside the United States and the lack of such protections 
for similarly situated aliens located outside the United States. See id. at 1026 (“Decisions of the 
Supreme Court and of this court . . . hold that the due process clause does not apply to aliens 
without property or presence in the sovereign territory of the United States.”) (citing, inter alia, 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990)). Verdugo-Urquidez, which involved 
the extraterritoriality of the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and 
seizures to a non-U.S. citizen, required that a non-citizen have a “previous significant voluntary 
connection with the United States” to invoke constitutional rights. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 
271. The logic of Verdugo-Urquidez was based on an expansive interpretation of Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), in which the Supreme Court held that federal courts lacked 
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus to twenty-one German nationals who were captured in 
China by U.S. forces and convicted before an American military commission in Nanking. 
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 766. The Eisentrager Court held that non-U.S. citizens captured outside 
U.S. territory and tried before a military tribunal on foreign soil could not bring writs of habeas 
corpus in U.S. courts to challenge their convictions. Id. at 785. But there are important factual 
differences between cases such as Eisentrager and Verdugo-Urquidez, on which Kiyemba I relied, 
and the circumstances surrounding Guantánamo noted in Boumediene, which Kiyemba I generally 
overlooked. For instance, Boumediene recognized that the Eisentrager petitioners were afforded a 
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the government’s overall accountability in resolving the crisis 
surrounding those detained individuals who remain virtually stateless at 
this time, especially now that President Obama has declared a wish to 
close the Guantánamo detention facility.239 A muscular procedural ruling 
in that case would look beyond the D.C. Circuit’s purely deferential 
stance toward the Executive’s repatriation process and consider the 
thoroughness of executive branch efforts to repatriate those detainees to 
third countries. Such a ruling would condition deference on the 
government’s demonstration of its own accountability as opposed to 
simply assuming that a rigorous process is underway. 
Kiyemba II takes an equally categorical position on the ability of 
federal courts to review executive branch decisions on repatriations.240 
Yet neither Kiyemba II nor the Supreme Court’s Munaf decision241 upon 
which it relies considered a scenario where there was evidence 
undermining the government’s assurance that detainees would not be 
harmed upon return. During oral argument in Kiyemba II, the panel 
questioned the government on the quality of those assurances but made 
no mention of that issue in its decision categorically deferring to 
                                                     
full adversarial process to challenge their detention, “entitled to representation by counsel, allowed 
to introduce evidence on their own behalf, and permitted to cross-examine the prosecution’s 
witnesses.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. __, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 2259–60 (2008). The Guantánamo 
detainees, by contrast, were provided with a limited CSRT process that “f[e]ll well short of the 
procedures and adversarial mechanisms that would eliminate the need for habeas corpus review.” 
Id. at 2260. Boumediene may therefore cabin Verdugo-Urquidez’s broad interpretation of 
Eisentrager, which “the executive branch has held in its back pocket for many years.” Neal K. 
Katyal, Executive and Judicial Overreaction in the Guantánamo Cases, 2004–2005 CATO SUP. CT. 
REV. 49, 54–55; see Neuman, supra note 45, at 285 (“The Boumediene opinion makes clear that 
lacking presence or property in the United States does not make a foreign national a constitutional 
nonperson whose interests deserve no consideration.”). The Kiyemba I court’s reliance on 
arguments Boumediene appears to discredit suggests potential room for reversal by the Supreme 
Court when it considers the case later this Term. 
The factual distinctions between Boumediene and Eisentrager illustrate ways that Eisentrager, 
like Munaf, 553 U.S. __,128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008), can be read as a decision of muscular procedure, 
for in Eisentrager the Supreme Court upheld executive branch decision-making in light of the 
satisfaction of critical procedural safeguards, obviating the need for greater judicial intervention. 
See also supra note 199 (discussing Munaf as a decision employing muscular procedure to affirm an 
executive branch decision). 
239. See supra note 132. 
240. Kiyemba v. Obama (Kiyemba II), 561 F.3d 509, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2009). For a discussion of 
Kiyemba II, see supra notes 194–99 and accompanying text. 
241. For a discussion of Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008), see supra note 
199. 
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executive expertise on repatriations.242 The recent Third Circuit decision 
in Khouzam v. Attorney General243 took a far more skeptical approach 
toward diplomatic assurances by holding that a petitioner who was 
denied an opportunity to challenge diplomatic assurances in the context 
of removal was denied due process rights.244 
Beyond Guantánamo, one lower court has already extended the 
Boumediene decision by interpreting the habeas corpus statute to apply 
at the Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan.245 The decision raises the 
prospect that prisoners might have legal rights to challenge their 
detention, no matter where in the world they are held, provided the 
United States has sufficient control of (and responsibility for) the 
detention facility. Significant to the decision was the court’s observation 
that the process used to determine a detainee’s status “at Bagram falls 
well short of what the Supreme Court found inadequate at 
Guantanamo,”246 suggesting, consistent with the decisions discussed 
previously, that the government is not entitled to unlimited discretion 
when holding individuals captured beyond the battlefield unless it can 
demonstrate through some meaningful process that the detainees are 
properly held. To the extent that the military is unable to adhere to these 
standards, the judiciary could conceivably issue additional decisions of 
muscular procedure as a corrective for those insufficiencies. 
CONCLUSION 
The post-9/11 executive detention cases provide occasion to consider 
how courts have conditioned deference upon transparency and 
deliberation in the crafting and implementation of security-related 
policy. By invoking procedural devices in this way, courts have brought 
large numbers of cases to effective resolution. Moreover, they have 
insisted that the coordinate branches engage in a more thorough and 
                                                     
242. The Kiyemba II panel pressed the government by asking whether it would accept “a holding 
that required a showing in each individual case” that the person being transferred would not be 
harmed upon return. The government’s counsel equivocated on the filing of individualized 
determinations, stating, “I don’t think that’s a worthwhile endeavor,” but conceded that “[i]f the 
court requires it, we would do that.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 6–7, Kiyemba II, 561 F.3d 509 
(No. 05-5487). 
243. 549 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2008). 
244. Id. at 257–59. 
245. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 235 (D.D.C. 2009). 
246. Id. at 227. 
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deliberative decision-making process. Courts have required Congress to 
oversee executive branch decision-making through clear legislation, and 
required the President to reasonably interpret authorizing legislation and 
properly implement congressional delegations of power. This muscular 
judicial review has generally focused on the means of coordinate branch 
decision-making, avoiding substantive policy determinations that are 
entrusted to the legislature and executive branches. Thus, while courts 
have yielded to the political branches in order to accommodate new 
challenges and a perceived emergency, they have required adherence to 
a standard of procedural regularity they themselves have set. In doing so, 
courts have reinforced their critical role in the broader tripartite 
framework, even within the highly freighted context of national security, 
by grounding decision-making within their own area of expertise. 
 
